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Relative used capital price, the measure of irreversibility, is fixed in almost
all the investment literature. This dissertation introduces investment models with
state-dependent irreversibility and tests whether these models outperform fixed ir-
reversibility cases, at both the macro and micro levels. Since there is currently no
historical data available on the issue of used capital prices, the first chapter uses
an indirect inference procedure to estimate the cyclical property of irreversibility
at the micro-level. In the second chapter, I propose a dynamic investment model
with endogenous irreversibility arising from the lemons problem in the used cap-
ital market and examine the cyclical implication of irreversibility. Data evidence
shows that capital reallocation, or used capital expenditure, is pro-cyclical. In a
general equilibrium framework, the third chapter reveals that the investment model
with state-dependent irreversibility explains this phenomenon while the model with
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Chapter 1
Fixed or State-dependent Irreversibility
1.1 Introduction
Irreversibility is the property of capital that plants have to sell their capi-
tal with a price lower than their purchasing price. The degree of irreversibility is
assumed to be fixed across time and states in the previous investment literature.
This paper employs an indirect inference method to test whether the level of irre-
versibility varies with aggregate states. The empirical results support pro-cyclical
irreversibility. That is, the relative used capital price, as the measure of irreversibil-
ity, is pro-cyclical.
The fixed irreversibility assumption is inappropriate from the theoretical
perspective. The underlying explanation for the fixed irreversibility is capital speci-
ficity. However, irreversible investment may result from lemons problem in the
used capital market. As pointed by Dixit and Pincyck in “Investment Under Uncer-
tainty”,
“Even investments that are not firm or industry specific are often partly ir-
reversible because buyers in markets for used machines, unable to evaluate the
quality of an item, will offer a price that corresponds to the average quality in the
market. Sellers, who know the quality of the item they are selling, will be reluc-
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tant to sell an above-average item. This will lower the market average qulity, and
therefore the market price.”
The irreversibility arising from lemons problem varies with aggregate states.
Investment decisions depend on the degree of adverse selection in the used capital
market while the magnitude of adverse selection relies on plants’ investment behav-
iors. In the presence of aggregate shocks, plants’ investment decision varies with
aggregate states, so does the degree of adverse selection. Therefore, the level of
irreversibility varies with the aggregate states.
Although lemons problem allows the irreversibility to vary with aggregate
states, previous studies still assume the irreversibility is fixed over time and across
states without testing the hypothesis. Due to the difficulty of collecting data, to esti-
mate the degree of irreversibility directly is rare and limited to some industry. Using
equipment-level data of aerospace industry, Ramey and Sharpiro (2001) report the
level of irreversibility is about .75 during the nineties. Other studies (Cooper and
Haltiwanger(2006), Bloom (2008), etc) consider irreversibility as one of capital ad-
justment costs. They estimate the fixed level of irreversibility along with parameters
of other capital adjustment costs indirectly, using simulated method of moments.
That is, they choose the parameters which best fit micro-level investment moments.
This paper also employs indirect inference procedure to estimate the cycli-
cal component of irreversibility along with other forms of capital adjustment costs.
The present paper differs from previous studies in two aspects. First, this paper
assumes that the irreversibility, or the relative used capital price, is a function of
aggregate shocks. By choosing a functional form which nests the fixed irreversibil-
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ity case, the proposed investment model can test whether the irreversibility varies
with aggregate states. Second, the present paper introduces an investment moment
with cyclical properties to pin down the state-dependent irreversibility. Based on
the observations in Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), the fraction of inactive
plants is negatively correlated with aggregate output.
The empirical results indicate that the irreversibility has a cyclical com-
ponent and the relative used capital price, as a measure of irreversibility, is pro-
cyclical. The rest of the paper organizes as follows: Section 1.2 describes the
state-contingent investment model; Section 1.3 outlines the estimation procedure
and results; Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 The Model
To estimate the cyclical component of irreversibility, this section introduces
an investment model with state-contingent irreversibility. Unlike the previous mod-
els (Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Bloom (2008)), the difference between
the price that the plant can buy capital goods and the price that the plant can sell
installed capital varies with aggregate states. The aggregate states are captured by
aggregate shocks At, which follow an AR(1) process in logs. The value with prime
stand for that next period.
logA′ = ρAlogA + υ′A with υA ∼ N(0, σ2A)
The function form is chosen so that the state-dependent irreversibility model
3
nests the model with fixed irreversibility.
ps,t(A) =
1
1 + exp(α1 + α2A)
ps,t is the selling price of capital at period t. At is the aggregate shock at period
t. ps,t ∈ [0, 1]. When α2 = 0, ps,t is a constant, which is the case with fixed
irreversibility. In addition to aggregate technology shocks, the plants face idiosyn-
cratic shocks at, which also follows an AR(1) process in logs. The aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks are independent and multiplicative.
loga′ = ρzloga + υ′z with υz ∼ N(0, σ2z)
In addition to irreversibility, other kinds of capital adjustment costs affect
plant investment behaviors. In this paper, I also estimate convex adjustment costs
and non-convex adjustment costs. The convex adjustment cost has a quadratic form.
The non-convex adjustment cost is proportional to the profit of the plant. It stands
for the destruction cost when investing or disinvesting capital. The plant is charac-
terized by the idiosyncratic shock a, the aggregate shock A and its predetermined
capital stock. The one-period profit function of a plant with a triple (a,A, k) is
defined as follows:
π(a,A, k) = aAkα
The plant’s investment problem is described in equation (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3).
V (a,A, k) = max{V a(a,A, k), V i(a,A, k)} ∀(a,A, k) (1.1)
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V a(a,A, k) = maxk′λπ(a,A, k)− ν
2
((k′ − (1− δ)k)/k)2k




V i(a,A, k) = π(a,A, k) + βEa′,A′|a,AV (a
′, A′, k(1− δ)) (1.3)
The buying price of capital is normalized to 1. The subscript “a” stands for the act
of investing, “i” for inaction. k is the predetermined capital stock at current period.
β is the annual discount rate . The annual depreciation rate is δ .
1.3 Estimating the Model
The main purpose of the paper is to estimate the cyclical component of the
degree of irreversibility. Besides the related parameters, the parameter vector θ of
in interest characterizes the the profit function, stochastic processes, convex adjust-
ment cost and non-convex adjustment cost. Because of no access to micro-level
data, this paper employs an indirect inference procedure to estimate the parameters
which minimize the distance between key moments and estimates from the sim-
ulated data and the actual data, reported in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). The
discount rate and depreciation rate are predetermined.
1.3.1 Two-Step Indirect Inference Procedure
The indirect inference procedure consists of two steps1. The parameters of
interest are divided into two groups. The first group includes the curvature of the
1An alternative method is to estimate the parameter vector simultaneously. As the indirect infer-
ence procedure includes a two-step GMM estimation, the computation load is extremely high.
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profit function and the parameters of the shock processes, θ1 = (α, ρA, vA, ρz, vz).
The second group includes the parameters of adjustment costs, θ2 = (λ, α1, α2, ν).
The first step of the estimation procedure is to estimate θ2 using simulated methods
of moments, given an initial guess of θ1, and generate a panel of simulated data. The
second step is to estimate θ1 using the simulated data. Then compare the distance
with the estimates from actual data. If it is very close, then stop the iteration.
Otherwise update the parametrization of θ1 and start the loop again.
At the step of SMM, a set of data moments µd is chosen for the model
to match. Given an arbitrary parametrization of (θ1, θ2), the optimal investment
policy is derived from solving the plant investment problem. This optimal policy is
used to simulate a panel with N plants and T periods. This procedure is replicated
for S times. The simulated moments µs are the average of these replications. In
the empirical exercise, the time period T is 15 years as the actual data is 15 year
long. Because of the computation load, The simulated number of plants is chose
to be 500, which is less than that in the real data. When increasing the number of
simulated plants, the empirical result does not change a lot.
The estimated θ̂1 is then the parameter vector which minimizes the follow-
ing objective function given θ2.
θ̂1 = argminθ1∈Θ1(µ
d − µs(θ1))′W (µd − µs(θ1)) (1.4)
W in equation (1.4) is the weighting matrix. In the empirical exercise, I use an
identity matrix2. Due to the potential for discontinuities of the objective function in
2In this paper, I do not use the optimal weight matrix because an estimation of variance-
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equation (1.4), a simulated annealing algorithm is used to find the global minimiza-
tion of the objective function.
The estimation of the parameter of non-convex adjustment cost is related
to the estimation of parameters of shocks. When plants adjust their capital stock,
they encounter some destruction costs so that the profit with capital adjustment is
proportional to the profit without adjustment. λ ∈ [0, 1] is the ratio. As econo-
metricians only observe the realized profit, it is hard to separate λ from the profit
function. Assuming λ = 1, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) estimate the parame-
ters of shocks and profit function based on the following quasi-difference function.
In their estimates, the curvature of the profit function α = 0.592. ρA = 0.76,
σA = 0.05, ρz = 0.885, σz = 0.30.
log(πi,t) = ρzlog(πi,t−1)+αlog(ki,t)−ρzαlog(ki,t−1)+log(At)−ρzlog(At−1)+vtz,i
(1.5)
At the second step of estimation, I re-estimate θ2 using the simulated data assuming
λ = 1. In equation (1.5), the aggregate shocks are unobservable. Thus, a complete
set of year dummies is used as their proxies in estimation. As described in Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006), the above equation is estimated via General Methods of
Moments (GMM). Lagged and twice lagged capital stock and twice lagged profits
are used as instruments. The weighting matrix is optimal.
covariance matrix of actual moments conditions is necessary to calculate the optimal weighting
matrix, as shown in page 88 in Adda and Cooper (2003) and page 31 in Gourieroux and Mon-
fort(1996). However, I do not have the access to individual observations. An alternative method is
to assume that the data moments have the same covariance matrix as their simulated counterparts.




As shown in Gourieroux and Monfort(1996), the estimators of indirect in-
ference is consistent. But the moment conditions have to be informative about
the parameters of interest. As the focus of the paper is the cyclical component of
irreversibility, the choice of moment conditions have to reflect the impact of state-
contingent properties. In the analysis of Caballero (1999), he states that the impact
of irreversible investment is on the inactive behaviors. Thus, I choose the correla-
tion of fraction of inactive plants and aggregate states as the moment condition.
The number of inactive plants varies over the cycles. The row “inacta” in
Table A.1 lists the fraction of inactive plants from 1974 to 1988. Inactive plants are
those whose invest or disinvest rates are less than 1%. These numbers are provided
by John Haltiwanger from the calculation of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). In
order to explore the co-movement with output, I use linear trend to separate cyclical
components of inaction rates and real GDP(Gross Domestic Production). Figure
A.6 plots their percentage deviations. From the figure, the inaction rate is high
when output is low. That is, the inaction rate is negatively correlated with output.
The correlation is -0.54598.
As we can not calculate the counterpart of total output from the partial equi-
librium investment model, I use the correlation of average profit shocks with in-
action rate as the proxy of the correlation between total output and inaction rates.
There are two reasons. First, the average profit shock is procyclical. The correla-
tion between the average profit shock and total output from 1974 to 1988 is 0.84245.
Second, the average profit shock across plants is approximately the aggregate profit
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shock. As shown in Figure A.6, the average profit shock is high when the inaction
rate is low. The correlation is -0.60749.
Other kinds of adjustment costs also affect the inaction rate over cycles.
Therefore, I estimate the convex and non-convex adjustment costs along with the
degree of irreversibility. The choice of other moment conditions follows Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006), which use the correlation of investment rate and profit shock,
the autocorrelation of investment rate, the positive and negative spike rate3. Those
moments are based on observations in Longitudinal Research Database(LRD) which
consists of about 7000 manufacturing plants in operation between 1972 and 19884.
1.3.3 Estimates of Irreversibility
This section presents our estimation results. Table A.2 summarizes main
results of this paper5. The empirical results provide substantial, statistically signif-
icant evidence for state-contingent irreversibility. Estimated values of α1 and α2
are 32.06 and -36.27 respectively in Table A.2. They are both significantly differ-
ent from zero. The rest of results support relative modest convex and nonconvex
adjustment costs. Estimate of λ is 0.8370 which is close to 0.796 in Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006). Our estimate of ν is relatively low, 0.031, which indicates
convex adjustment cost plays a small role in our model.
3The positive (negative) spike rate is the fraction of investment rate which is larger (less) than
20%(−20%).
4After computing the investment rate and the autocorrelation of investment rate, the time period
is 15 years.
5For this result, the curvature of profit function is 0.588. The serial correlation of aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks are 0.692 and 0.90 respectively. The conditional volatilities of the shocks are
0.0545 and 0.28 respectively.
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The used capital price as the measure of the degree of irreversibility is pro-
cyclical. When the whole economy faces a positive technology shock, the used
capital price increases. That is, the capital adjustment cost decreases when selling
capital. On the contrary, the convex and non-convex adjustment costs increase in
the boom.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper estimates an investment model with state-contingent irreversibil-
ity in a partial equilibrium framework. Estimation results support pro-cyclical price
premium between the selling price and buying prices of capital. As we know, the
price premium is determined by the interaction between new and used capital mar-
kets and it is affected by the information structure in used capital market. To deeply
understand the nature of capital adjustment, an explicit model in a general equi-
librium framework will be helpful to analyze different forces in these markets and
evaluate the impact of aggregate uncertainty on the price premium quantitatively.
10
Chapter 2
State-dependent Irreversibility and Lemons Market
2.1 Introduction
Lemons problem in the used capital market is one of the main explanations
for partial irreversible investment. But previous literature does not study the de-
termination of the degree of irreversibility arising from lemons problem. As the
magnitude of irreversibility depends on plant investment decisions, this kind of
investment models predicts state-contingent irreversibility in the presence of aggre-
gate shocks. What is the cyclical property of irreversibility arising from lemons
problem? Are the model predictions consistent with data ? This chapter develops
an investment model with adverse selection and answers these questions.
Although previous studies assume that the degree of irreversibility is fixed,
there are some evidences supporting the cyclical irreversibility. First, as shown in
the first chapter, the relative used capital price, as the measure of the degree of ir-
reversibility, is procyclical. When the economy faces a common positive shock,
the used capital price is relatively higher. Second, according to the Annual Capital
Expenditures Survey, the fraction of used capital expenditure over total capital ex-
penditure is countercyclical. That is, when the economy faces a common positive
shock, the demand of the used capital is lower relative to the demand of the new
11
capital. In this chapter, I propose a framework to study the investment behaviors
in the presence of adverse selection in the used capital market and characterize the
optimal investment policy analytically. In a calibrated economy, the implied cycli-
cal property of used capital price is consistent with the empirical results in the first
chapter. The fraction of used capital expenditure is also countercyclical.
This paper models the impact of adverse selection on investment behaviors
explicitly. In the model economy, capital has two types: good quality or bad quality,
which are unobservable to buyers. Plants can invest in new and used capital market,
but can only disinvest in the used capital market. The quality of new capital is
exogenous while that of used capital is endogenous. No-arbitrage condition makes
plants indifferent between two markets. Since the quality of used capital is higher
than that of bad capital, owners of lemons always sell out bad capital. Since the
quality of used capital is lower than that of good capital, plants never buy used
capital and sell good capital simultaneously. Besides selling lemons, plants have
three kinds of actions: selling good capital, inaction (no selling good capital and no
purchasing capital) and purchasing capital.
The optimal investment decisions follow a two-side sS rule. When the idio-
syncratic shock of an plant is less than the lower threshold, the plant sells good
capital. When the idiosyncratic shock is above the upper threshold, the plant pur-
chases capital. If the idiosyncratic shock is between the two thresholds, the plant
only sells bad capital. The two thresholds are contingent to the market conditions:
the used capital price and plants’ beliefs about the average quality in the used capital
market.
12
In a pooled used capital market, the quantities of capital sold equal the quan-
tities of capital purchased, which derives the equilibrium used capital price. The
qualities of the capital sold determines average quality in the market. In equilib-
rium, plants’ beliefs are consistent with the realized average quality in the market.
That’s how irreversibility, as measured by used capital price, interacts with plants’
investment decisions in the presence of asymmetric information in the used capital
market.
Existing plants sell used capital for two reasons: hold lemons or face low
idiosyncratic shocks. This feature of the model avoids the breakdown of used cap-
ital market in Akolof(1970). The used capital price is related to both quantities
and qualities of capital sold in the market. As the quality and price of new capital
are fixed1, the used capital price increases with average quality in the market, or
everyone go to the new capital market.
The interaction between two assets and combination between sS adjustment
and adverse selection are closely related to the works in House and Leahy(2004)
and Eisfeldt(2004). House and Leahy(2004) studies the impact of adverse selection
in a used durable market. They find sS bands shrink when increasing the variance
of taste shock. Eisfeldt(2004) uses adverse selection to explain the illiquid long
term risky asset in the equity market. The comparative statics show that liquidity
increases with productivity level.
The model with endogenous irreversibility predicts state-dependent irre-
1The new capital price is numeraire in the model.
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versibility in a world with aggregate uncertainty. Different uncertainty level af-
fects the thresholds of sS rule. Plants’ investment decisions are also contingent to
aggregate uncertainty. The corresponding irreversibility hence has cyclical com-
ponent. The capital adjustment cost from irreversibility is also endogenous and
state-dependent. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005) find only countercyclical capital re-
allocation costs can explain the coexistence of procyclical capital reallocation and
countercyclical benefit in the firm-level. As all the physical adjustment costs are
procyclical, they infer that the countercyclical costs come from “informational and
contractual” frictions. The cyclical implication of the present model is consistent
with their findings.
The irreversibility arising from lemons problem is countercyclical. The pos-
itive technology shock increases the demand for used capital and decreases the in-
centives of incumbents to sell good capital. Used capital price goes up while the
fraction of good capital in the used market tends to decline. The no-arbitrage condi-
tion between new and used capital markets requires the used capital price increases
with rising quality. In the calibrated model, plants invest more on new capital which
has higher quality at the good state. Thus average quality of exiting plants is higher
if aggregate uncertainty is persistent. The sales from exiting plants compensate the
declining quality in the market. Used capital price and fraction of good capital are
both high in the boom. Thus investment is more reversible in the boom and capital
reallocation is procyclical.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2.2 de-
scribes the model. Section 2.3 characterizes the properties of decision rules and
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equilibria. Section 2.4 explores the cyclical properties of irreversibility. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 The Model
The model embeds asymmetric information in the used capital market into a
two-period investment problem. Plants can invest in new and used capital markets,
but only disinvest in the used capital market. The private information about the
quality of capital causes the relative used capital price less than one. The capital
adjustment cost occurs endogenously. The interaction between two markets and the
adverse selection determine the equilibrium used capital price, i.e. the degree of
irreversibility. The higher the price is, the less irreversible the investment is.
2.2.1 Production and Quality of Capital
Capital is the only input of production. The quality of capital describes the
extent of utilization of capital in production. The quality of good capital is 1, and
that of bad capital is φ ∈ (0, 1). Plants produce the single good with the Cobb-
Douglas production function (α ∈ (0, 1)):
y = aAk̃α; k̃ = kg + φkb
where kg and kb are good and bad capital stocks, k̃ is the efficiency units of total
capital stock, A is the level of aggregate uncertainty and a is the plant-specific
productivity. The aggregate uncertainty follows a two-state Markov chain with a
stationary transition matrix. πij is the probability to have Aj next period given Ai
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this period, i, j ∈ {h, l}. Aggregate uncertainty and plant-specific productivity are
multiplicative and independent.
2.2.2 Information Structure and Used Capital Market
Plants have private information about the qualities of their capital. Buyers
purchase used capital as a price taker. The key assumption is the anonymity of the
used capital market. Or the actions of sellers would potentially reveal the quality
of capital, for example, the quantity of capital sold, the turnover rate of capital
even the observable plant-specific productivity. The used capital market acts like a
middleman who trades with plants at an equilibrium price.
In a pooled used capital market, buyers purchase a bundle of good and bad
capital. Denote Q by the fraction of good capital in the market. The average quality
here is Q+φ(1−Q). To simplify the model, I assume that the quality of used capital
equals the average quality in the market. In the new capital market, the fraction
of good capital is q0, which is exogenous. The quality of new capital equals the
average quality.
q̄ = q0 + φ(1− q0)
2.2.3 The Investment Problem
Plants live two periods. The economy has a continuum of plants each pe-
riod, half of which are young, the rest are old. At the end of each period after
production, young plants make investment decisions, and old plants sell all of their
capital and exit. At the beginning of next period, young plants become old. Same
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fraction of newborns enter the world with new capital stock k0. Every entrant picks
a productivity draw from the distribution function F (·), which has a positive sup-
port. At the initial period, the aggregate good and bad capital stocks from old plants
are K̄0g and K̄
0
b .
Young plants believe that the fraction of good capital in the used capital
market is λ. The quality of used capital in their minds is:
λ̄ = λ + φ(1− λ)
They can buy new capital or used capital. They can also sell good capital or bad
capital. Denote new capital expenditure by in; used capital expenditure by iu; dis-
investment of good capital ig and disinvestment of bad capital ib. The efficiency
units of capital stock at the beginning of next period are:
k̃′ = inq̄ + iuλ̄ + k0(1− δ)q̄ − ig − ibφ
An individual young plant’s problem at period t is described as follows:
max{in,t≥0,iu,t≥0,ig,t∈[0,k0(1−δ)q0],ib,t∈[0,k0(1−δ)(1−q0)]}Π1,t+βE{Π2,t+1|At} s.t. (2.1)
Π1,t = aAt(k0q̄)
α − in,t − pu,t(iu,t − ig,t − ib,t) (2.2)
Π2,t+1 = aAt+1k̃
′α
t + pu,t+1(1− δ)(iu,t + in,t + k0(1− δ)− ig,t − ib,t) (2.3)
The new capital price is numeraire. Π1,t is the profit of the plant at period t.
The subscript “1” implies that the plant is young. Π2,t+1 is the profit of the plants
at period t + 1. The subscript “2” indicates that the plant is old. The subscript “t”
stands for the time period t. β is the discount factor. pu,t is the used capital price at
period t. δ is physical depreciation rate.
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2.2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
The used capital price and consistent belief are equilibrium outcomes each
period. In the used capital market, old plants always sell capital. Denote K̄tg and
K̄tb by the aggregate good and bad capital stocks of old plants at the beginning of








(iu,t−1(1− λt−1) + in,t−1(1− q0) + k0(1− q0)(1− δ)− ib,t−1)dF
Young plants are the potential buyers and sellers. The used capital market clearing









ib,tdF + (1− δ)(K̄tg + K̄tb) (2.4)





ig,tdF + (1− δ)K̄tg (2.5)
Definition 1. The competitive equilibria of the economy {β, δ, α, q0, φ, F (·), Π, Ah,




b } are these sequences:
{pu,t, λt, {in,t(a)}, {iu,t(a)}, {ig,t(a)}, {ib,t(a)}}∞t=0
that solve plants’ problems and clear the used capital market and satisfy the con-
sistency belief condition.
• Given {pu,t, λt}, {iu,t(a), in,t(a), ig,t(a), ib,t(a)} solve (2.1)-(2.3).
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• Given plants’ decision rules, the pair (pu,t, λt) satisfies (2.4)-(2.5) each pe-
riod.
The supply from old plants is inelastic in the used capital market, thus the
equilibrium belief is well-defined. The demand for used capital must be positive
while that for new capital could be zero in equilibrium. This paper focuses on the
case with positive aggregate new investment as in the reality. All the stationary
equilibria have positive aggregate new investment in the paper.
2.3 Stationary Equilibria
2.3.1 The Equilibrium Belief and Price
If the fraction of good capital in the total capital stock of old plants is less
than q0 at the end of initial period. The fraction later on is bounded below q0. The
following assumption provides a sufficient condition such that the fraction of good














≤ q0, for all t ≥ 1.
The equilibrium belief is positive. As aggregate new investment is non-
negative, the aggregate good capital stocks for each generation must be positive.
Since old plants have to sell all of their capital. Some good capital is always in
the used capital market. In equilibrium, the belief is consistent with the market
realization. Thus the equilibrium belief is always positive. On the other side, the
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equilibrium belief can’t exceed some upper bounds. Every plant sells its lemons
since the quality of used capital is higher than that of bad capital. The fraction of
good capital is below the fraction of good capital in the new capital market. The
upper bound for equilibrium belief is q0.
Proposition 2.3.1. The equilibrium belief λt ∈ (0, q0).
New and used capital are perfect substitutes in production. The ratio of mar-
ginal products equals the ratio of average qualities in two markets. In a frictionless
economy, I can construct a redundant good which has the same fraction of good
capital as the used capital. The price ratio between the constructed good and new
capital equals the ratio of qualities. In the presence of asymmetric information,
one unit of new capital has to be sold at pu,t no matter how high the quality is. To
give plants’ incentives to buy new capital, the price ratio has to be higher than their
quality ratio.




From proposition 2.3.2, the lower bound of used capital price is λ̄t
q̄
. The
new capital price is 1. Both new and used capital have resale value pu,t+1 per unit
next period. Since the average quality of new capital is higher than that of used
capital. The used capital price should be less than new capital price. The following
proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.3.3. The equilibrium used capital price pu,t ∈ ( λ̄tq̄ , 1).
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2.3.2 Optimal Investment Policy
Proposition 2.3.1 implies that the quality of used capital is higher than that
of bad capital. Plants always sell out their lemons. The quality of good capital is
higher than that of used capital, so plants do not sell good capital and buy used cap-
ital at the same time. The no-arbitrage condition indicates that plants are indifferent
between new and used capital investment. Therefore the solutions to the plants’
problems are not unique. But the target efficiency units of capital are unique.
Kt1(a) =
(










Kt1(a) is the target efficiency units of capital if the plant with productivity
level a purchases capital. Kt2(a) is the target if the plant sells good capital. They
come from plants’ first order conditions with interior solutions. Let the good capital
stock of young plant at the end of period 1, k0q0(1− δ), be the base point of further
investment. Denote i0,t(a)2 by the increment of efficiency units from the base point.
The investment decisions about i0,t and ig,t are thus unique.
The decision rules act like the standard sS policy. When the productivity
level is below some threshold a
¯t
, the plant sells its good capital. When the produc-
tivity level is above a certain threshold āt, the plant purchases capital. When the
productivity level is between two thresholds, the plant only sells bad capital.
Proposition 2.3.4 (two side (s,S) rule). In an equilibrium with positive aggregate
investment, there exist two cutoff values of idiosyncratic shocks, a
¯ t
< āt and the
solutions of plants’ problems at period t are as follows:
2The idiosyncratic shock a is omitted in the following text.
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1. When a > āt, i0,t = Kt1(a)− k0q0(1− δ), ig,t = 0, ib,t = (1− δ)k0(1− q0).
2. When a
¯ t
≤ a ≤ āt, i0,t = 0, ig,t = 0, ib,t = (1− δ)k0(1− q0).
3. When a < a
¯ t
, i0,t = 0, ig,t = k0(1− δ)q0 −Kt2(a), ib,t = (1− δ)k0(1− q0).
Graph A.4 plots a plant’s optimal decision policy in a steady state. The
blue line stands for plants’ initial capital stock after selling all of their bad capital,
k0q0(1 − δ). The green line plots the target level of efficiency units when selling
good capital, K2(a). The red line plots the target level of efficiency units when
purchasing capital, K1(a). a1 and a2 are cutoff values in Proposition 2.3.4. The
area between K1(a) and K2(a) describes the optimal efficiency units of capital next
period. When the line k0q0(1− δ) is above the area, the optimal choice is to adjust
capital stock downwards. When the line is below the area, the optimal choice is to
buy capital. If the line falls in the area, the plant keeps its capital stock k0q0(1− δ).
The capital adjustment costs arise from adverse selection in the used capital
market. Sellers of lemons get adjustment subsidy since the quality of bad capital
is below average quality in the used market. Sellers of good capital and buyers of
used capital both face capital adjustment costs. Sellers lose one unit of efficiency
capital when selling one unit of good capital, the loss in terms of new capital is 1
q̄
.
They get pu,t. The capital adjustment cost of good capital sellers is 1q̄ − pu,t which
is positive. When buyers get one unit of used capital, they pay pu,t and receive λ̄t
units of efficiency capital. The capital adjustment costs of buyers are pu,t− λ̄tq̄ which
is also positive. Thus I can use used capital price as the measure of irreversibility.
The higher the used capital price is, the less irreversible the investment is.
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2.3.3 Definition of Recursive Stationary Equilibrium
The aggregate state space includes aggregate good capital stock, K̄g, aggre-
gate bad capital stock, K̄b, from old plants and aggregate uncertainty level. In many
general equilibrium models, average capital stock is not the sufficient statistics for
the equilibrium price. The price depends on the cross-sectional distribution that
varies with aggregate uncertainty. The individual’s problem has to be solved with
approximation method because the distribution is infinite dimension. In the present
model, although the distribution of old plants’ capital stock varies, they all have
to sell their capital. In an anonymous used capital market, the average levels are
enough to pin down the used capital price and fraction of good capital. Denote the
aggregate state vector by X = [K̄g, K̄b, A] ∈ S = R2+ × {Ah, Al}. The individual
state variable is a ∈ Sa = R+.
As mentioned before, new and used capital are perfect substitutes. The
solution to plants’ problem is a convex set. But the pair (i0,t, ig,t) is unique for each
plant. Now think i0,t as a bundle of new and used capital. Suppose used capital
provides x fraction of efficiency units of i0,t. One unit of the combination good
consists of xt
λ̄
unit of used capital and 1−xt
q̄
unit of good capital. Then the efficiency
unit is one per bundle. After applying the no-arbitrage condition, the price of the




. The recursive formulation of plant’s problems
can be simplified as follows:




(−1 + βEpu(X ′)(1− δ))i0 + pu(X)ig
+ pu(X)k0(1− q0)(1− δ) + βE(aA′k̃′α + pu(X ′)(1− δ)(k0q0(1− δ)− ig))
s.t. k̃′ = i0 + k0q0(1− δ)− ig
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i0 ≥ 0; ig ∈ [0, k0(1− δ)q0]; K̄ ′g = H1(X); K̄ ′b = H2(X)
xt doesn’t appear in the plants’ problem. It is constructed to clear the used capital







x, as a function of aggregate state vector, is also part of equilibrium outcomes.
Definition 2. The stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with aggregate pos-
itive investments is characterized as these functions: used capital price pu : S →
(0, 1), consistent belief λ : S → (0, q0), fraction of efficient investment on used
capital x : S → (0, 1), laws of motions of average good and bad used capital stock
of old plants, H1 : S → S and H2 : S → S, value function V : Sa × S → R+,
decision rules i0 : Sa × S → R+, ig : Sa × S → [0, k0q0(1− δ)]such that given X:
• (V, i0, ig) satisfy the above plants’ maximization problem given (pu, λ, H1, H2).





(q̄ − λ̄(X))β(1− δ)E[pu(X ′)|X]
q̄
(2.6)









+ (K̄g + K̄b)(1− δ)
(2.7)









ig(a,X)dF (a) + K̄g(1− δ) (2.8)
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)i0(a; X) + k0q0(1− δ)













The existence of equilibrium depends on the parameterizations of the model.
In a case with two idiosyncratic shocks without aggregate uncertainty, Proposition
B.2.1 in appendix B.2 describes the sufficient conditions for the existence of equi-
librium. For more complicated case, to find the existence conditions for the fixed
point with five functionals is hard. The solution strategy is to assume that the equi-
librium exists, compute it and check whether the solution satisfies the equilibrium
conditions.
2.3.4 Computation Algorithm
The solution of the equilibrium is a fixed point of five functionals (pu, λ, x,
H1, H2) which satisfy equation (2.6),(2.7),(2.8),(2.9) and (2.10) for any X . The
computation algorithm mainly bases on projection method.
Let B(X) be the space of functions: pu : S → (0, 1). Define an operator





(q̄ − λ̄(X))β(1− δ)E[pu(X ′)|X]
q̄
; given H1 and H2.
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T satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions thus is a contraction mapping. There
exists a unique pu given the initial guess of H1, H2, λ. The solution reduces to a
fixed point with four functionals.
Proposition 2.3.5. T is a contraction mapping.
As usual, the first step is to discretize the state space. If divide the state
space by many rectangulars, in some grid points, K̄g is high and K̄b is low, which
does not satisfy Lemma 1. The resulted λ may be larger than q0. T may not have




as one dimension of aggregate state vector instead of K̄b. According
to Lemma 1, rkb ∈ [1− q0, 1). The new state vector X̃ = [K̄g, rkb, A] ∈ R+ × [1−
q0, 1)× {Ah, Al}.
As for the approximation methods for these functionals, I choose tensor
product of “not-a-knot” cubic splines as used in Khan and Thomas(2003). The
rest of the computation algorithm includes inner loop and outer loop. Given laws
of motions of H1 and H2, the inner loop finds (pu, λ, x) that satisfy no-arbitrage
condition, used market clearing condition and consistency of belief. The outer loop
is to update the laws of motions until converge. The last step is to check whether the
computed results satisfy the equilibrium conditions. If x(X̃) ∈ (0, 1) and λ(X̃) ∈
(0, q0) thus pu(X̃) < 1 for all X̃ , it is the equilibrium of interest.
3The solution to equation (2.6),(2.7),(2.8),(2.9) and (2.10) may have some points where pu > 1
and λ > q0, which does not have economic sense. In other words, the state space of (K̄g, K̄b) is
larger than the set of (K̄g, K̄b) in equilibrium. It is okey in mathematics, but it is hard to isolate
the case where the equilibrium of interest does not exist. One way to solve this problem is to use
non-rectangular grid points. But the technique for multi-dimensional interpolation over such areas
is under-developed. That’s why this paper uses a different state space.
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2.4 Characterization of Stationary Equilibrium
2.4.1 Calibration
Table A.9 summarizes baseline parameter values. I use standard parameters
as much as possible and calibrate the non-standard parameters in a way consistent
with relevant micro and macro level moments. The purpose is to study the cyclical
implication in the presence of adverse selection with the parameterized model.
The model period is one year. The discount rate of plants β equals 0.95.
The depreciation rate δ is 0.069. The curvature of production function, α = 0.592.
In the paper, the production function is in fact the profit function, which can be
derived from plants’ profit maximization problem with static labor choice. Thus
the curvature follows the estimation in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
The distribution of plant-specific productivity F is calibrated by the station-
ary distribution of idiosyncratic shocks in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). They
assume the idiosyncratic shocks follow an AR(1) process and estimate the coeffi-
cients with plant-level data. The persistence coefficient is 0.885 and standard de-
viation for idiosyncratic innovations is 0.3. I use Tauchen’s method to transform
the AR(1) process into a 40-state stationary Markov process. Then use the transi-
tion matrix to compute the stationary distribution. The upper and lower bounds of
plant-specific productivity are 0.2756 and 3.6280.
Parameters of aggregate uncertainty follow Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
The high aggregate uncertainty level Ah = 1.015, the low aggregate uncertainty
level Al = 0.985. The conditional probabilities πhh and πll are both 0.75. They
choose the parameters to match the facts that the frequency of U.S. business cycles
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is four years and annual standard deviation of the logarithm of aggregate total factor
productivity is 15%.
The model endogenizes the irreversibility of an investment problem. The
degree of irreversibility depends on the parameterizations. The rest of parameters
are the fraction of good capital in new capital market, q0, the efficiency of bad
capital φ and the initial capital stock k0. I choose non-standard parameters to match
some selective moments in the steady state. The first target moment is the fraction
of used capital expenditure, the average of which is 7.3158%4 according to “Annual
Capital Expenditures Survey ” from 1996 to 2006. The second target moment is the
annual entry rate, measured as the ratio of capital stocks of entrants over total capital
stock. Since there is no good estimation for the ratio in terms of capital stock5, I use
the average job creation of entrants between 1973 and 1988 in Davis, Haltiwanger
and Schuh (1996) instead. The annual entry rate is 1.44%. The third target moment
is the fraction of inactive plants. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) report that the
fraction is 8.1%. Their definition of inactive plants is those whose gross investment
is less than 1%. Table A.10 summarizes the calibration results. The calibrated
parameters match the first two moments well. But for the third moment, owners of
lemons always sell their bad capital, the negative investment is high in the model.
Thus the fraction of inactive plants is low.
4The two period plant problem makes the fraction of used capital very high. In reality, most of
capital stock of old plants are not sold in the used capital market. I therefore use the fraction of used
capital expenditure from young plants to match the data moment.
5Becker, et al(2004)report roughly that the ratio is less than one percent. But they also point out
that their data set missed observations at some boom years whcih makes the estimation lower
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The aggregate state variables K̄g and rKb are both discretized into 49 equally
distributed grids. The upper bound for rkb, the ratio of aggregate bad capital, is
0.324. The lower bound is 0.3206. I also set the upper and lower bounds of aggre-
gate good capital, K̄g, are 65.1 and 61.9. Plant-specific productivity as mentioned
before has 40 states between 0.2756 and 3.6280.
2.4.2 The Equilibrium Used Capital Price
Graph A.2 plots the equilibrium outcomes as functions of K̄g when rKb =
0.3215. Graph A.3 plots the equilibrium outcomes as functions of K̄b when K̄g is
fixed at 62.77. The solid lines stand for functions at the good state and the dotted
lines represent those at the bad state. The good sate means that it has high aggregate
uncertainty level.
The consistent beliefs are the same both at the high and low uncertainty
level according to the right panels of Graph A.2 and A.3, which results from the
approximation of the continuous distribution function. Although the support for
the distribution function is (0,∞), the discrete state space has lower bound. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 2.3.4, the lower threshold a
¯t
is an increasing
function of k0. The calibrated k0 is so small that even the smallest grid of the plant-
specific productivity distribution is above the lower threshold value. That indicates
no young plants sell good capital in the approximated model economy.
Graph A.2 and A.3 show that the used capital price increases with aggregate
uncertainty level when fixing (K̄g, rKb). That’s because the supply for used capital
is inelastic while the demand is larger at the high uncertainty level. Then the used
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capital price is higher at the good state than that at the bad state.
In graph A.2, used capital price and consistent belief increase with K̄g.
Since the fraction of bad capital from old plants rKb is fixed and no young plants
sell good capital, the more good capital is in the market, the higher the average qual-
ity of the used capital is. Thus the consistent belief λ increases. When the average
quality is high, the no-arbitrage condition between new and used capital markets
drives the used capital price up. In graph A.3, used capital price and consistent
belief decreases with rKb. Since the more bad capital is in the market, the lower
the consistent belief λ is. The used capital price declines because of the interaction
between new and used capital markets.
The equilibrium used capital price is very close to 1. That’s because old
plants have to exit and sell out their capital. Then the quality of used capital is very
close to that of new capital. According to Proposition 2.3.3, the used capital price
is between the ratio of average qualities and one. Thus the price is very close to
one. This result doesn’t mean that the affect of information friction is neglectable.
If extending the life cycle of plants, we can anticipate different result. The analysis
here in fact sheds light on the qualitative effect of adverse selection on investment.
2.4.3 Cyclical Properties
This section studies the cyclical property of the model. Here one time series
is procyclical means that its cross-sectional correlation with aggregate uncertainty
is positive. With the price functions and laws of motions, I simulate the model
economy for 10000 periods. After dropping the initial 1000 periods, I compute the
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correlations of equilibrium outcomes with aggregate uncertainty each period. Table
A.5 summarizes the cyclical results.
The consistent belief is procyclical because new capital expenditure is higher
at the good state. The new capital has higher quality than used capital. Thus the
average quality of old plants’ capital stocks tends to be high at the good state. The
quality of used capital next period is also high. When the aggregate uncertainty is
persistent, old plants sell relatively more good capital at the good state. Thus the
average quality of used capital is procyclical, so is consistent belief.
The used capital price is procyclical because of the interaction between new
and used capital market. The no-arbitrage condition links the (relative) used capital
price with average quality of used capital. No matter how the supply side change,
the used capital price increases with consistent belief. Thus we can not analyze the
supply and demand in an isolated used capital market.
In the model economy, aggregate uncertainty affects used capital price through
two potential channels. First, high aggregate uncertainty increases demand for used
capital and decreases supply of good capital from young plants. The used capital
price tends to increase. Second, the decreasing sales of good capital lower the frac-
tion of good capital in the market, so is the consistent belief. The used capital price
decreases with the average quality in the market because of no-arbitrage condition.
In the calibrated model, no young plants sell good capital and the supply for used
capital is inelastic.
The new and used capital with different qualities just like the capital with
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different vintage. We can understand the the underlying story in such a way: Plants
invest on vintage capital. In good time, they invest more in new capital, which
has higher quality. They sell old vintage capital, which has lower quality. If the
aggregate productivity shock is persistent, the average quality in the used market is
high at the good state. Thus the relative used capital price is high at the good state.
Total used and new capital expenditure are pro-cyclical. That is consistent
with procyclical investment in the data. The procyclical used capital price implies
that the opportunity cost to sell used capital is lower in booms. This cyclical im-
plication is consistent with the counter-cyclical capital reallocation cost in in Eis-
feldt and Rampini (2006) 6. In their model, the reallocation cost is the extra cost
when selling capital across sectors. In a calibrated model, they find only coun-
tercyclical reallocation cost can match the coexistence of procyclical quantity and
countercyclical benefit of capital reallocation. Although they assume the capital
reallocation cost has some specific function form, they infer the cost arising from
informational and contractual problems in the economy since all physical adjust-
ment costs measured by output are procyclical. This paper constructs and calibrates
a structural model where the investment faces information problems. The cyclical
result of the model is the same as their findings. Thus information friction may play
an important role in capital reallocation.
6Their measure of capital allocation is in the firm level which includes acquisition. However, the
amount that their capital reallocation minuses acquisition is also procyclical.
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2.4.4 Robustness
This section checks the robustness of cyclical results when varying the pa-
rameterizations of the model. The first exercise is to examine whether the per-
sistence of aggregate uncertainty determines the magnitude of correlation between
irreversibility and uncertainty. Table A.6 presents the cyclical results when vary-
ing the persistent level of uncertainty. πll = πhh. The higher the persistence is,
the higher the correlations of the consistent belief and used capital price are. This
indicates that the persistence is important to understand the cyclical results of the
model. The second exercise explores the robustness of the cyclical results when
varying non-standard parameters. Table A.7summarizes the results . The used cap-
ital prices are all procyclical.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies a dynamic investment model with state-dependent irre-
versibility. Investment is partial irreversible because of adverse selection in the
used capital market. Irreversibility is state-dependent because the equilibrium level
of irreversibility is determined by plants’ investment decisions, which vary with
aggregate state. The higher the aggregate state is, the less irreversible the invest-
ment is. One implication of the model is that capital adjustment cost arising from




Partial Irreversible Investment and Cyclical Capital
Reallocation: the Role of Adverse Selection
3.1 Introduction
Evidence shows that capital reallocation, measured as the aggregate sales of
(used) capital, is procyclical.1 Figure A.5 plots the cyclical components of output
and the aggregate Sales of Property, Plant and Equipment (SPPE) from the Compu-
stat database, which is the proxy for the sales of used capital.2 This graph displays
a significant positive correlation between SPPE and output. It is well known that
the investment in new capital is procyclical. The joint observation of procyclical
investment and the sales of used capital is interesting: In a good state, the aggre-
gate technology shock is high, thus plants invest more. But why do plants also sell
more?
Evidences also shows that plants sell their capital even after age-related de-
preciation (Ramey and Shapiro (2001), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)). Veracierto
(2002) studies the implication of micro-level irreversible investment on conven-
tional business cycle statistics (aggregate consumption, investment and labor input).
1In this paper, the sales of capital are equivalent to the sales of installed capital or the sales of
used capital.
2The aggregate time series is constructed from the annual firm level data. The detailed descrip-
tion is in Appendix C.1.
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However, existing studies do not explore the aggregate implication of irreversible
investment on capital reallocation. Although adverse selection and capital speci-
ficity are two main explanations for irreversible investment, previous literature does
not model the underlying mechanism explicitly. And the levels of irreversibility are
exogenously chosen in Veracierto (2002).
This paper studies the aggregate implication of irreversible investment on
capital reallocation after establishing the consistency with evidences on selling
price of used capital. In a calibrated economy, the present paper confirms the
result in Veracierto (2002) that micro-level non-linearity arising from irreversible
investment does not matter for the conventional business cycle statistics. How-
ever, the fluctuations of capital reallocation are very different between models with
and without micro-level irreversible investment. In particular, I find that the model
with endogenous irreversibility arising from adverse selection explains the cyclical
movement of capital reallocation well.
In this paper, I employ adverse selection in the used capital market to explain
the procyclical sales of capital. The model allows for capital goods of different
qualities, which are measured by their productivity. Capital quality is unobservable
to buyers. They choose to invest in new or used capital goods. Since the quality of
the used capital is higher than that of the bad (low quality) capital, plants always
sell all of their bad capital first, regardless of whether they are in a good state or
bad state. Thus, the sales of capital do not drop significantly when the economy
faces a positive aggregate shock. In addition, the model economy consists of a
continuum of plants with heterogeneous technology shocks. The plants with high
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idiosyncratic shocks accumulate more capital at the same time. Accordingly, the
sales of bad capital become higher over time. As the aggregate technology shock is
persistent, the sales of capital are procyclical after combining the two effects.
In addition, plants with low idiosyncratic technology shocks may sell part
of their good (high quality) capital. Selling good capital is costly since the quality
of the good capital is higher than that of used capital. Like the standard partial
reversible investment model, a plant’s optimal investment decision follows a two-
sided (S, s) policy after selling all of its bad capital. That is, given a plant’s idio-
syncratic shock and aggregate states, there exist two cut-off values. First, the plant
sells its good capital when its capital stock is above the upper threshold. Second,
the plant buys capital when its capital stock is below the lower threshold. Other-
wise, the plant does not adjust its capital. When plants purchase capital, they are
indifferent concerning new and used capital, because of the no-arbitrage condition
between the two markets. Therefore, the model explains the procyclical sales from
the supply rather than demand side.
The investment in this model is costly reversible because of the private in-
formation in the used capital market. The price of used capital, as a measure of
the irreversibility of investment3, is endogenously determined by the interaction be-
tween the new and used capital markets and the degree of adverse selection. There-
fore, the used capital price also depends on aggregate states. In contrast, the level of
irreversibility is assumed to be fixed across states in the previous investment liter-
3The irreversibility refers to the property of capital in that the resale value of capital is lower than
its purchasing cost.
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ature (Bloom (2007), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Faig (2001), and Veracierto
(2002)). So I term their models “fixed irreversibility models”, where the level of
irreversibility can be interpreted as the price of used capital.
The adverse selection model is calibrated to match the evidence of the price
discount in selling capital and the fraction of used capital expenditure over total
capital expenditure in the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES). Finally, the
model successfully replicates the procyclical sales of capital in the data. Moreover,
the correlation between the sales of capital and output is 75.2% of its data counter-
part.
However, a decentralized economy with fixed irreversibility arising from
capital specificity fails to generate the procyclical sales of capital, when using the
same calibration strategy. In order to examine the capital reallocation across firms,
the fixed irreversibility model is decentralized to an economy with a fixed price
of used capital. 4 In particular, plants sell their capital when they encounter low
technology shocks. The demand for used capital must fluctuate along with the
movement of the sales of capital to clear the market. When the economy faces a
common positive technology shock, all plants have higher technology levels. They
would like to maintain more capital. Therefore, the sales of capital are counter
cyclical in this kind of models.
The relative price of used capital is found to be procyclical in the adverse
4This model economy is a decentralized version of Veracierto (2002) where the plant loses a
constant fraction of values when selling capital. See Appendix C.4 for details.
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selection model, which concurs with the estimation results in Li (2007).5 In the
model economy, when there is a positive aggregate shock, the price of used capital
first goes down, since less good capital is sold in the market. Then the price in-
creases as the extra capital accumulated previously increases plant expectation for
the price. The increased new investment also drives the price up by improving the
quality of used capital. Finally, the used capital price returns to its original level
together with the aggregate capital stock.
Procyclical capital reallocation is first documented in Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2006) along with the countercyclical benefit of capital reallocation. In a calibrated
two-sector model, they impute the countercyclical capital reallocation cost. In their
model, capital reallocation includes acquisition and sales of capital. Their cost of
capital reallocation is in the form of exogenous convex capital adjustment cost,
while my model aims to understand the procyclical sales from the view of micro-
foundation. The relation between adverse selection and investment in my paper is
similar to that described in House and Leahy (2004). They study the impact of ad-
verse selection in dynamic durable goods markets, where the durable goods last two
or three periods. My paper examines the quantitative impact of adverse selection in
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, which includes new and used
capital markets. As well, the investment also has extensive and intensive margins
in my model.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 3.2
5See section 3.2 for details.
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presents the relevant data facts. Section 3.3 describes the baseline investment model
with adverse selection. Section 3.4 characterizes the properties of decision rules and
the equilibrium. Section 3.5 discusses the calibration of the baseline model. Sec-
tion 3.6 reports the macroeconomic implication of the baseline model and section
3.7 presents the conclusions.
3.2 Data Facts
This section documents the main data facts that the paper aims to explain.
First, the amount of capital reallocation from incumbents is procyclical. Second,
plants sell their capital at a discount even after age-related depreciation. The dis-
count of selling price differs between continuing plants and exiting plants.
In this paper, capital reallocation is defined as the reallocation of productive
assets across firms which involves physical movement of capital. The quantity of
capital allocation equals the used capital expenditure, which emphasizes the invest-
ment decisions. The capital reallocation, or the used capital expenditure, includes
the sales of capital from both incumbents and exiters. I use the annual data on Sales
of Property, Plant and Equipment (SPPE) in the Compustat database as the measure
for sales of capital from incumbents6. (See Appendix C.1 for details.)
6It is worth noting that, sales of property, plant and equipment from large incumbents, for exam-
ple, in the Compustat database, are not equal to the used capital expenditure of large incumbents.
Generally, the sales of used capital are related to the size of the firm. According to Columbia Indus-
trial Survey, the correlation between sales of fixed assets, excluding lands, with total employment is
0.2, which is significant at one percent significance level. However, large firms invest less on used
capital than small firms. As stated in Table 5, in the report of Annual Capital Expenditure survey in
1995, the new equipment expenditure for companies with five employees or more is 6.77 times of
that for companies with fewer than five employees, while the amount of used equipment expenditure
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Sales of property,plant and equipment7 are procyclical. After deflating by
the Consumer Price Index (CPI)8, the correlation of SPPE with output is 0.4479
using hp-filtered log series. The correlation is 0.4537 using linear-trended log se-
ries. The two statistics are both positive and significant. Table A.8 summarizes the
results. Figure A.5 plots the cyclical component of SPPE against that of GDP. The
SPPE drops substantially when the GDP is significantly low.
According to the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES), the mean
fraction of used capital expenditure over total capital expenditure is 7.5%. Since the
survey is designed to provide broad-based statistics for both new and used capital
expenditure, it includes all the domestic, private, and non-farming firms.
The rest of the data facts is related to the discount in the selling price. Ramey
and Shapiro (2001) directly estimate the resale value of capital relative to replace-
ment cost in a shrinking aerospace industry. The estimated discount is found to
be 41.9% − 83.6%9 for these exiting plants. Using indirect evidence (Simulated
Method of Moments), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) report that the discount is
98.1%10 for continuing plants. In my model, the parameters are calibrated accord-
ing to the direct evidences: the mean fraction in ACES and the discount in Ramey
and Shapiro (2001). Then the endogenous price discount is compared with the
is almost the same (1.06 times) as that for companies with fewer than five employees. The data on
structure expenditure also replicated similar results.
7Without any further notation, the SPPE means the SPPE from incumbents.
8Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) studies the cyclical results for reallocation among different capital
price deflators in addition to CPI. They find the results are essentially same.
9The result is from Table 5 in Ramey and Shapiro (2001).
10The result is from Table 5 in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) .
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estimate as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
The direct evidence for the cyclical property of resale price is limited. Pul-
vino (1998) studies commercial aircraft transactions and finds that the resale prices
are lower during recessions. Since there is currently no historical data available on
the issue of used capital prices, Li (2007) uses an indirect inference procedure to
estimate the cyclical component of the used capital price, assuming the price is a
function of the aggregate shock. The estimation results indicate that the relative
used capital price has a procyclical component, which concurs with the result in
this paper.
3.3 The Model
The model economy embeds adverse selection in the used capital market
into an otherwise standard real business cycle model. There is a continuum of
households and a continuum of production units, which I call plants. Households
own plants by holding equities. Unlike the stochastic growth model, there exist two
capital markets: new and used. Plants can invest in both markets, but only disinvest
in the used capital market. The only capital adjustment cost comes from partial
irreversibility arising from private information in the used capital market. In this
section, I first explain the information structure and quality of capital, then describe
plants, households and equilibrium.
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3.3.1 Information Structure and Quality of Capital
In the model, the plants produce one kind of commodity which can be used
as consumption or investment. The commodity is homogenous for consumption
while it has different qualities when using as investment. Once the good is installed
for purposes of production, I call it capital. The capital good has two quality types:
good or bad. The quality refers to the productivity of capital in production. The
quality of good capital is designated a value of 1, and that of bad capital is desig-
nated a value of 0. That is, in production, the good capital can be fully used while
the bad capital is useless for production11. Only owners know the true capital type.
Thus, plants have private information about the qualities of their capital. The frac-
tion of good capital in the output is q0. Thus, in the economy, the quality of capital
is determined in the process of production12.
There are two kinds of capital markets in this economy: new and used. In
the new capital market, plants sell their output. Since even the producers do not
know the qualities of their products, the new capital market is pooled. As the new
capital good has q0 fraction of good capital, the average quality of new capital is
q0
13. For simplicity, I assume that every unit of new capital bought from the market
11If the assumption is relaxed and the bad capital has a positive productivity, but less than the
value of 1 which is assigned to good capital, the main results of the paper will not change. Please
refer to my previous paper “State-dependent Irreversibility and Lemons Market”.
12An alternative assumption is to let the capital deteriorate in the process of utilization with some
fixed probability. Under this assumption, the quality of new goods is 1. The level of relative used
capital price will change accordingly, but the properties of decision rules and equilibrium won’t
change.
13The average quality equals the weighted average of good and bad capital. q0 = q0(1) + (1 −
q0)(0).
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contains q0 fraction of good capital. If the capital good is infinite-divisible, this
assumption acts as the law of large numbers. The price of new capital is normalized
to 1 in each period.
The used capital market acts like a middleman who trades with plants at an
equilibrium price. In the market, sellers know the qualities of their capital. They
can choose to sell good or bad capital while buyers can not observe the quality of
the used capital. What they buy is a combination of good and bad capital. Both
buyers and sellers are price-takers. The equilibrium price is pinned down when
the demand for used capital equals the total sales of good and bad capital. In this
paper, I impose the pooling equilibrium in the used capital market, and exclude any
possibility of alleviating the information problem by forming contracts.
Unlike the new goods market, the quality of used capital is endogenously de-
termined by plants’ investment decisions. As buyers can not observe the qualities of
capital, they make investment decisions based on their belief, which represents the
anticipated fraction of good capital sold in the market. In equilibrium, the plants’
belief equals the realized fraction of good capital in the market. Denote the belief as
λ. In equilibrium, the average quality of used capital is then λ. Similarly to the new
capital market, I assume that buyers get λ fraction of good capital per unit of used
capital. The relative used capital price, pu,t, is then determined by the interaction
between plants’ investment decisions and the degree of adverse selection.
In this paper, the investment is costly reversible. It has two implications:
First, the selling price of capital is less than the purchasing price. Thus, plants only
get part of their initial investment after depreciation, when selling their capital;
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Second, at the aggregate level, the installed investment goods can not be used as
consumption goods. For this reason, the model economy has a separate used capital
market.
In the previous literature, the relative used capital price is fixed14. The new
and used capital goods are perfect substitutes. Thus the fluctuation of the sales of
capital has no impact on the determination of used capital price, since the demand
for used capital has to change accordingly to clear the market. So the existence of
a separate used capital market is trivial as long as aggregate investment is strictly
positive.
3.3.2 Plants
The model economy consists of a continuum of plants. A typical plant
produces its output by employing good capital stock kg and labor n. The output
can be used as consumption goods or new investment goods. When the output is
used as new investment goods, it contains q0 fraction of good capital. Each plant
employs a Cobb-Douglas Decreasing Return to Scale production technology,
y = aAkαg n
ν with α ∈ (0, 1); ν ∈ (0, 1); α + ν < 1
Here, a is the idiosyncratic technology shock while A reflects the aggregate tech-
nology shock, or stochastic total factor productivity. The two shocks are inde-
pendent and multiplicative to the production procedure. The aggregate technology
14In a model without costly reversible investment, the relative used capital price is 1. In a model
with fixed irreversibility, the selling discount of capital is a constant, which is less than 1. The
relative used capital price is still 1 in a decentralized economy. See Appendix C.4 for the model.
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shock, A ∈ ZA, follows a continuous Markov process with a stationary transition
function. ZA is a compact Borel set in R+. The idiosyncratic shock, a ∈ Za,
is specified as a na state Markov chain with a stationary transition function Qa.
Za = {a1, a2, ...ana}. To simplify the notation, denote Z as Za × ZA = {z =
(a,A) : a ∈ Za, A ∈ ZA}. Z is the Borel subsets of Z. The transition function,
Q : Z × Z → [0, 1], is monotone and has the Feller property.
In addition, the plant is subject to an exit shock before the realizations of
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. That is, a plant has a probability of exiting the
economy at the beginning of each period. Let η be the surviving rate. η ∈ (0, 1).
1− η is the exiting probability. When a plant exits the economy, it has to liquidate
its capital stock in the used capital market. Because of the continuum of plants, the
measure of exiting plants is 1 − η if the total measure of plants is 1. At the end
of each period, the new plants enter the economy with zero capital and different
initial productivity levels, which are drawn from the stationary distribution of the
idiosyncratic shock Fss. For tractability, the measure of total plants is fixed across
time. Thus the measure of entrants is 1− η in each period.
In every period, a plant is defined by its good capital stock, kg ∈ Eg, bad
capital stock, kb ∈ Eb, and idiosyncratic technology shock a ∈ Za. Eg = [0, k̄g],
Eb = [0, k̄g]. k̄g and k̄b are described explicitly in Appendix C.2. At the beginning
of each period, a plant first observes its exit shock. If exiting, the plant has to sell its
good and bad capital stocks. Otherwise, the plant observes its idiosyncratic shock
and aggregate states. The incumbent then continues production and makes labor
and investment decisions. At the same time, new plants enter the market with zero
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capital and initial idiosyncratic productivity draw. Figure A.6 plots the timing and
evolution of the economy.
When an exiting plant liquidates its capital, it has an extra selling discount
due to capital specificity. Denote pc as the fraction of capital stock that can be sold
in the used capital market. Since the used capital price is pu, the liquidating value
is pupc per unit of capital stock, which includes both good and bad capital.
Plants choose to purchase capital from new and used goods markets. Denote
in as the investment in new capital goods. in ≥ 0. Denote iu as the investment
in used capital goods. iu ≥ 0. Plants choose to sell good capital ig ∈ Eig =
[0, kg(1−δ)], or to sell bad capital ib ∈ Eib = [0, kb(1−δ)]. In the economy, output,
capital and consumption grow at rate r − 1 along the balanced growth path. r is
the gross growth rate. Therefore, all the variables are expressed in terms of efficient
units. All the variables are deflated by the level of labor augmenting technology.
The evolutions of the plant’s good and bad capital stocks are as follows15
rk′g = (1−δ)kg+inq0+iuλ−ig; rk′b = kb(1−δ)+in(1−q0)+iu(1−λ)−ib (3.1)
δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital. Let y = (k′g, k′b, ig, ib) ∈ Y be the











g(1− q0)− rk′bq0 − (kg(1− q0)− kbq0)(1− δ) + ig(1− q0)− ibq0)
15 The primes stand for values one period ahead.
16In section 3.4, I show that λ < q0 in equilibrium.
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The aggregate states include aggregate technology shock A ∈ ZA and the
distribution of plants over (kg, kb, a). Let s = (kg, kb, a) ∈ S. Denote S = Eg ×
Eb×Za by the product space for individual state variables. Let S be the σ−algebra
of S. The distribution of plants over the triple is then characterized by a Borel
probability measure µ on S. Denote D as the set of distribution functions on S.
µ ∈ D. The evolution of this distribution is characterized by a mapping H, which
is described explicitly in section 3.4. Let X = S ×Za ×D be the product space of
state variables.
The following correspondence describes the constraints on the control vari-
ables:
Γ(s, A, µ) = {y ∈ Y :, in ≥ 0; iu ≥ 0} for all (s, A, µ) ∈ X.
The incumbent makes employment and investment decisions after observing its
idiosyncratic shock and the aggregate states. The plant’s labor decision is static.
So I first derive the explicit form of labor demand from the one-period profit maxi-
mization problem.













1−ν − ν 11−ν )
w is the wage in the model. The one period return function, F : X × Y → R, is
F (kg, kb, a, A, µ, y) = f(kg, a, A)− in − puiu + puig + puib
in and iu are defined as above. The plant aims to maximize its expected discounted
value. As the plant is owned by households, it discounts the future value with a
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stochastic discount factor, d(A, µ) = β Ep(A
′,µ′)
p(A,µ)
. p(A, µ) is the marginal utility of
consumption. Now the investment problem can be formulated in terms of utilities.
The following is the plant’s optimization problem,












In the right-hand side of equation (3.2), the second term states the discounted
present value as an incumbent next period, and the third term is the discounted
present value as an exiting plant next period. β is the discount factor of a rep-
resentative household. Given the used capital price pu(A, µ), the intertemporal
price p(A, µ) and the law of motion µ′ = H(µ,A), the plant’s labor demand
is n(kg, kb, a; A, µ). The next period’s capital stocks are k′g(kg, kb, a; A, µ) and
k′b(kg, kb, a; A, µ). The sales of good and bad capital are ig(kg, kb, a; A, µ) and
ib(kg, kb, a; A, µ). The purchases of new and used capital are in(kg, kb, a; A, µ) and
iu(kg, kb, a; A, µ). In the Appendix C.2, I prove the uniqueness of the fixed point in
the dynamic programming problem. Further in section 3.4, I simplify the problem
and characterize the properties of decision rules.
3.3.3 Households
In the model, households are identical. They own the plants and accumulate
dividends. In addition, the asset market is complete. Thus, I only model the static
maximization problem of a representative household, and focus on the first order
conditions which determine the equilibrium wage and the intertemporal price. The
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representative has the utility function U(C, N s) = logC +sl(1−N s) The intertem-
poral price, p(A, µ), is defined as the marginal utility of the household. The wage
can be pinned down from the first order condition with respect to labor choice:
p(µ,A) = UC(C, N






3.3.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Three markets exist in the model economy: used capital market, new goods
(capital) market and the labor market. The incumbents are the potential buyers and
sellers in the used capital market. The exiting plants have to sell their capital in the
used capital market. Thus the corresponding market clearing condition is:
η
∫
iu(s; A, µ)dµ = η
∫





(kg + kb)(1− δ)dµ
(3.3)
The left-hand side of equation (3.3) is the total demand for used capital. The
surviving rate η in the equation indicates that only incumbents demand used capital.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3.3) is the sales of good capital
from incumbents. The second term is the sales of bad capital from incumbents.
The last term is the total sales of capital from the exiting plants. Since the exit rate
is exogenous, the sales in the last term are a fraction of total capital stock. New
goods can be used as consumption and investment. The new goods market clearing
49
condition and labor market clearing conditions are:
C(µ,A) + η
∫
in(s; A, µ)dµ = η
∫
f(kg, a, A)dµ (3.4)
N s(µ,A) = η
∫
n(s; A, µ)dµ (3.5)
In equilibrium, the plant’s belief about the quality of used capital is consistent with





ig(s; A, µ)dµ + (1− η)pc
∫





Definition 3. A recursive competitive equilibrium for the economy {β, δ, η, Q, sl,
α, ν, pc} consists of: (a) Plant’s policy functions, in, iu, ig, ib, k′g, k′b, n, and value
function v; (b) Household’s consumption C and labor supply decision N s; (c) The
belief λ, equilibrium wage w, and the intertemporal price p; (d) The law of motion
of the distribution H . Such that, 1. Given w and p, C, and N s maximize the
representative household’s utility; 2. Given w, p, λ, pu, and H , u solves (3.2)
and the plant’s decision rules are in, iu, ig, ib, k′g, k
′
b, and n. 3. w, p, pu, and λ
satisfy labor market clearing condition (3.5), new good market clearing condition
(3.4) and used good market clearing condition (3.5), given the decision rules of the
household and the plant ; 4. The consistent belief λ satisfies condition (3.6); 5.
The law of motion of the cross-sectional distribution, H , is generated by the plant’s
decision rules, aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks.
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3.4 Characterization of Recursive Equilibrium
In this section, I describe the properties of the equilibrium belief and used
capital price, and characterize the plant’s optimal investment policy. Since in the
real world, the new investment, which is part of GDP, and used capital investment,
which reflects capital reallocation, are always positive, the rest of this paper focuses
on the equilibrium where both new and used capital investment are strictly positive.
After employing the properties of the belief and used capital price, the dynamic pro-
gramming problem with three individual state variables and four control variables
is simplified to a problem with only one endogenous individual state variable.
3.4.1 Aggregate Capital Stocks
At the initial period of the economy, there is no used capital in the economy.
Thus, the ratio of good capital in total capital stock is q0 at the initial period. Define
the aggregate good and bad capital stocks as followings:
Kg =
∫
kg(kg, kb, a; A, µ)dµ; Kb =
∫
kb(kg, kb, a; A, µ)dµ.
The aggregate new and used capital investments are defined as:
In = η
∫
in(kg, kb, a; A, µ)dµ; Iu = η
∫
iu(kg, kb, a; A, µ)dµ.
The aggregate sales of good and bad capital goods are specified as:
Ig = η
∫
ig(kg, kb, a; A, µ)dµ +
∫
(1− η)(1− δ)pcK̄gdµ; (3.7)
Ib = η
∫
ib(kg, kb, a; A, µ)dµ +
∫
(1− η)(1− δ)pcK̄bdµ. (3.8)
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In the economy, the capital stock at the beginning of next period is determined by
the investment decisions of incumbents. The laws of motions of aggregate good
and bad capital stocks are characterized as follows:
rK ′g = ηKg(1− δ) + Inq0 + Iuλ− Ig (3.9)
rK ′b = ηKb(1− δ) + In(1− q0) + Iu(1− λ)− Ib (3.10)
The laws of motions can be rewritten as:
rK ′g = Kg(1− δ)(η + (1− η)pc) + Inq0 (3.11)
rK ′b = Kb(1− δ)(η + (1− η)pc) + In(1− q0) (3.12)
The extra discount from liquidating increases the effective depreciation rate. Since
the fraction of good capital stock in the economy is q0 in the initial period, the
fraction is the same in all periods. The fixed ratio helps to reduce the number of
aggregate state variables when computing the approximate laws of motions.
Lemma 2. Kg,t
Kg,t+Kb,t
= q0, ∀ t > 0.
3.4.2 The Equilibrium Belief and Price
The equilibrium used capital price pu,t is less than or equal to 1. Otherwise,
given any investment decision, the plant can earn positive profit by purchasing new
capital and selling it in the used capital market. Thus, optimal investment decisions
do not exist. So this paper only focuses on the equilibrium with pu,t ≤ 1.
In the model economy, the exit rate is exogenous. As a result, a positive
amount of good capital is always in the used capital market, since the economy
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consists of a continuum of plants. Therefore, the consistent belief λt is strictly
positive. Next, I analyze the equilibrium by assuming λt < q0. Later I show that
the consistent belief has to be less than q0 in the equilibrium. The plants take the
aggregate laws of motions as given when making investment decisions.
Proposition 3.4.1. The problem (3.2) has a unique fixed point v ∈ C(X).
To have a well-defined solution, I assume that the intertemporal price func-
tion p(A, µ) and the used capital price pu(A, µ) are continuous and bounded func-
tions on Za × D. The proof in Appendix C.2 is standard by applying Contraction
Mapping Theorem and the Maximum Theorem.
Proposition 3.4.2. ∀ x ∈ X , iu(x) · ig(x) = 0. ib(x) = kb(1− δ).
In an optimal investment policy, plants sell all their bad capital. If they
sell a positive amount of good capital, their purchase of used capital must be zero.
Similarly, when they purchase used capital, the sales of good capital should be
zero. This is intuitive since the quality of used capital is less than the quality of
good capital, but higher than that of bad capital. If a plant has some amount of bad
capital, it can sell the bad capital and buy the same amount of used capital without
any extra cost. Even though the total amount of capital stock does not change, the
quality of the capital improves. A similar story applies to the choice between the
sales of good capital and the purchases of used capital. In Appendix C.2, I rewrite
the problem by using total capital stock as one of the state variables to prove the
proposition.
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The proposition 3.4.2 still holds when λ ≥ q0. Now plants have even higher
incentive to sell their bad capital in the used capital market. On the other hand,
plants will not sell all their good capital because of Inada condition. Thus, in equi-
librium, the consistent belief is always less than q0.
Proposition 3.4.3. The equilibrium belief λt ∈ (0, q0).
Since plants sell all their bad capital, the marginal benefit of bad capital is
a constant over individual states. This argument leads to the following proposition.
The marginal product of bad capital is in terms of utility in this proposition.
Lemma 3. v(kg, kb, a; A, µ) is partially differentiable with respect to kb ∈ (0, k̄b)
for every (a,A, µ) ∈ Z ×D. Further, v2(kg, kb, a; A, µ) = ppu(1− δ).
The fixed marginal benefit of bad capital across individual states implies that
plants choose new or used capital investment concurrently. Plants have two ways
to improve bad capital: to invest in new or used capital markets. The purchasing
cost for the new or used capital is the same across individual plants. Thus, if the
relative cost for new capital is lower, plants will all invest in new capital. Other-
wise they all choose used capital. Since this paper only examines the equilibrium
with strictly positive new and used capital investments, the following proposition
presents a condition where new and used capital investments can coexist.
Proposition 3.4.4. [no-arbitrage condition]
pu =




Under no-arbitrage condition, the return on investment in new capital equals
the return on used capital. In other words, new and used capital are perfect substi-
tutes. Denote MRg17 as the marginal benefit of increasing one unit of good capital
stock. When increasing one unit of new capital, its cost is rp units in terms of
efficiency and utility. The marginal benefit from good capital is q0MRg , and the
marginal benefit from bad capital is (1 − q0)MRb. The cost for new capital is 1.
When a plant buys one unit of used capital, or rp unit in terms of efficient units and
utility, the marginal benefit from good capital is λMRg, and the marginal benefit
from bad capital is (1 − λ)MRb. The cost for used capital is pu. MRg and MRb
can be derived from Khan-Tucker condition. Now the return of new capital equals
the return of used capital. q0MRg + (1− q0)MRb = 1pu (λMRg + (1− λ)MRb).
Proposition 3.4.5. The equilibrium used capital price pu,t ∈ (λtq0 , 1).
According to 3.13, the used capital price is related to consistent belief λ,
stochastic discount factor βEp
′
p
and the expected used capital price Epu. q0 < λ,
17 The value function is differentiable almost everywhere since it is monotonic, thus it is proper.
For those non-differentiable points, the marginal product of good capital is in fact the subdifferential
at the optimal solution. As a closed proper concave function with a convex feasible set, the maximum
of the problem achieves when satisfies Kuhn-Tucker conditions. When the plant buys capital, the
Lagrangian Multipliers for in ≥ 0 and iu ≥ 0 are zero. The corresponding Khan-Tucker conditions
are
−r(1− λ− pu(1− q0))
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λ− q0 = 0
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q0 − λ = 0
The marginal benefit of the good capital is MRg = β(1 − η)(1 − δ)E(p′up′)pc + βη
∫
∂u1. The




thus pu > λq0 . The equilibrium used capital price is less than 1 since the stochastic




3.4.3 Simplified Version of Recursive Equilibrium
In this section I use the properties of equilibrium to simplify the dynamic
programming problem. Since the new and used capital are perfect substitutes, the
policy correspondence is not single-valued. I then construct an equilibrium where
every plant invests x fraction of efficient units in used capital, when buying capital.




(rk′g − kg(1− δ)); in =
1− x
q0
(rk′g − kg(1− δ))





(1 − λ) + 1−x
q0
(1 − q0))i0, which does
not depend on k′b. Denote X4 = Eg × Z ×D, the following lemma shows that the
value function can be expressed as the sum of two separate functions.
Lemma 4. v(kg, kb, a; A, µ) = u(kg, a; A, µ) + ppu(1 − δ)kb. u(x) ∈ C(X4) for
every x ∈ X4.
Based on Lemma 4, I focus on the function u to solve the plants’ decision
rules. The new one period return function F : X4 → R is:
F (kg, k
′
g, a; A, µ) = f(kg, a, A)p + p1(rk
′
g − kg(1− δ))1rk′g>kg(1−δ)
+ pu(kg(1− δ)− rk′g)1rk′g≤kg(1−δ) + β(1− δ)(1− η)pck′gE(p′up′)
(3.14)
where p1 = 1rq0 (β(1 − δ)(η + (1 − η)pc)E(p′up′)(1 − q0) − rp). p1 < 0 which
follows from pu ≤ 1 and the no-arbitrage condition. p1 is like the effective price for
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good capital. By applying the no-arbitrage condition, −p1 > pu. The investment in
the good capital is still costly reversible. The simplified recursive problem (FE3) is
as follows:




g, a; A, µ)+βη
∫
u(k′g, a
′, A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′) (3.15)
The policy correspondence G1 : X4 → Eg is as follows:
G1(x) ={k′g ∈ Eg : u(x) = F (kg, k′g, a; A,mu) + βη
∫
u(x′)Q(z, dz′)}
for all x ∈ X4
Proposition 3.4.6. Problem 3.15 has a unique fixed point v ∈ C(X4). For every
x ∈ C(X4), u(x) : X4 → R is strictly increasing and strictly concave in the
first element kg. The policy correspondence G1(x) : X4 → Eg is a continuous,
single-valued function.
Since plants’ investment decisions only depend on (kg, a; A, µ), most of ag-
gregate variables in the market clearing conditions and the consistency condition
can be obtained without knowing the information about bad capital. Although the
aggregate bad capital stock is present in these conditions, the amount of total bad
capital stock can be derived from Lemma 2. So I only focus on the distribution
over (kg, a). Denote S1 = Eg × Ea by the product space of individual state vari-
ables. Let S1 be the σ-algebra of S1. The distribution of plants is characterized by
a Borel probability measure µ1 on S1. Denote D1 as the set of distribution func-
tions on S1. µ1 ∈ D1. The evolution of the distribution is described by a mapping
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H1. When there is no aggregate technology shock, the model has a unique invari-
ant distribution over the pair (kg, a).18 The following equations represent the used
goods market clearing condition, the new goods market clearing condition, the la-





(rhg(kg, a; A, µ1)− kg(1− δ))1rhg(kg ,a;A,µ1)>kg(1−δ)dµ1
=
∫
(kg(1− δ)− rhg(kg, a; A, µ1))1kg(1−δ)≥rhg(kg ,a;A,µ1)dµ1












(rhg(kg, a; A, µ1)− kg(1− δ))1rhg≥kg(1−δ)dµ1
Nh(A, µ1) =
∫
N(kg, a; A, µ1)dµ1
λt =
∫






(rhg(kg, a; A, µ1)− kg(1− δ))1rhg(kg ,a;A,µ1)>kg(1−δ)
µ′1 = H1(A, µ1)
Definition 4. A recursive competitive equilibrium for the economy {β, δ, η, Q, sl,
α, ν, pc} with strict positive demands for new and used capital goods is a set of
functions (pu, p, x, λ, w, H1, u, hg, N s, C, n) such that: 1) (u, hg, n) satisfy plant’s
maximization problem (3.16) given (pu, λ, p, x, w); 2) (C, N s) solve household’s
problem given (w, p); 3) Used capital market clears; 4) New goods market clears;
18 The full proof is available under request.
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5) Belief is consistent; 6) No arbitrage condition (3.13) is satisfied; 7) Consistency
of laws of motion is satisfied.
The law of motion for the distribution over the pair (kg, a) is given by:
















Here, µ′1(Ek×ET ; A, µ) describes the measure of plants with k′g ∈ Ek and a′ ∈ ET
next period, given aggregate state (A, µ1) ∈ Za×D1. The first term is the measure
of plants who are incumbents. They transit from the current shocks to the shock a′
and choose next period good capital stock k′g ∈ Ek. The second term is the measure
of plants who are entrants. When 0 ∈ Ek, the second term is the measure with
initial productivity draw a′ ∈ Za.
3.4.4 Two-sided (s, S) Rules
After selling all their low quality capital, the plant’s optimal policy follows
a two-sided (s, S) rule. That is, given a plant’s idiosyncratic shock and aggregate
states, there exist two threshold values of capital stock: firstly, when the capital
stock is above the upper threshold, the plant sells its good capital; secondly, when
the capital stock is below the lower threshold, the plant buys capital; otherwise, the
plant does not adjust its capital. The following proposition summarizes the policy.
Proposition 3.4.7. [two-sided (s, S) rules] For every (a,A, µ1) ∈ Z × D1, there




when kg < x1(a,A, µ1); second, k′g = k
∗




kg(1− δ). k∗1 = 1rx1(a,A, µ1)(1− δ). k∗2 = 1rx2(a,A, µ1)(1− δ).
After deciding to buy or sell capital, the plant’s optimal capital stock next










u(x′)Q(z, dz′) + β(1− η)(1− δ)pck′gE(p′up′)
k∗2(x) = argmax
k′g∈Eg
− purk′g + βη
∫
u(x′)Q(z, dz′) + β(1− η)(1− δ)pck′gE(p′up′)





1 , the cutoff value in which plants are indifferent between buying or
inaction; x2(x) = r1−δk
∗
2 , the cutoff value in which plants are indifferent between
selling or inaction.
The two-sided (s, S) policy is standard for the partial reversible investment.
In this paper, the used capital price is determined in equilibrium. Thus the fluctua-
tion of used capital price has an impact on the cutoff vales, which is different from
the fixed irreversibility model.
3.5 Computation
3.5.1 Solution
The dynamic programming problem in (3.15) is hard to compute directly
since the cross-sectional distribution µ1 is infinite-dimensional. The solution is to
assume that the plant makes decisions based on limited information, the mean of
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aggregate capital stock rather than the distribution µ1. In this paper, I apply the two
steps recursive procedure developed in Krusell and Smith (1998), Kahn and Thomas
(2008), and Bachman, Caballero and Engel (2008). The procedure includes an inner
loop and outer loop. Given the approximate laws of motions, I first solve the plant’s
optimization problem in the inner loop, then I use the policy functions to simulate
the evolution of the economy, and update the approximate laws of motions. This
procedure ends when the metric between two successive laws of motions, and the
prediction error are both less than the stopping criteria.
The model economy has three kinds of approximate laws of motions: ag-
gregate capital stock K̄g, the relative used capital price pu, and the intertemporal
price p. I choose log-linear function forms from the previous literature. Since the
aggregate shock is continuous, each approximate law of motions has one regression
equation19:
logK ′g = ak + bklogKg + cklogA (3.17)
logpu = au + bulogKg + culogA (3.18)
logp = ap + bplogKg + cplogA (3.19)
where Kg is the current aggregate good capital stock. The aggregate bad capital
stock is not in the approximate functions since the ratio between aggregate good and
bad capital is fixed across time. The equilibrium wage is a function of intertemporal
price, thus I do not specify its rule here. Similarly, given the used capital price and
19In Krusell and Smith (1998) and Kahn and Thomas (2008), the aggregate shock is discrete, thus
they have more than one equation for each law of motions.
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the above approximate laws of motions, the consistent belief can be derived from
the no-arbitrage condition. I also choose x, the fraction of efficient investment in
used capital, such that the used capital market clears. Thus both x and λ are not
specified here.
The inner loop begins with an initial guess of approximate laws of motions.
For equation (3.17), (3.19), I use the estimates from the frictionless case. For equa-
tion (3.18), I choose au as the logarithm of the used capital price in the steady
state, and bu and cu equal zero. In the inner loop, I solve the problem (3.15) after
substituting Kg for µ1 with value function iteration and Howard improvement al-
gorithm. The aggregate shock is continuous, thus I use seven nodes Gauss-Hermite
Quadrature to compute the conditional mean. (See Appendix C.5 for more details.)
The two-sided (s, S) policy reduces the computation load significantly. The
two target capital levels k∗1 and k
∗
2 are independent of the current good capital hold-
ings. Thus, I can compute the two target levels, and the two threshold values for
each state (a,A, Kg) separately. Then I compare the value of inaction with these
threshold values for each grid to determine the optimal investment decisions.
The outer loop simulates the economy and update the approximate laws of
motions. First, I simulate a sequence of aggregate technology shock. Second, the
economy begins with an exogenous capital distribution. The initial distribution for
idiosyncratic shocks is its stationary distribution. Third,given the policy functions
last period, the current p and pu clear the new goods market and satisfy the consis-
tent belief condition when fixing the future expectations. In other words, I use the
given approximate laws of motions to compute the expected values of pu and p. But
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the equilibrium conditions must hold under the current prices. Again, x is chosen to
clear the used capital market, and λ comes from the no-arbitrage condition. To find
the equilibrium, it is only necessary to compute two equations for two unknowns.
The labor market clears naturally. Now the distribution for (kg, a) can be derived
with the equilibrium prices, decisions, and the previous distribution.
This procedure now generates a panel of pt, pu,t and Kg,t. The last step of
the outer loop is to find new approximate laws of motions with an OLS regression.
When the distance between two sets of coefficients is small enough, the procedure is
terminated. The next step is to check whether the R2 is high enough. In this paper,
the implied R-squares are higher than 0.99, this means there are no big mistakes
when using the approximate rules.
3.5.2 Calibration
To evaluate the aggregate implication of endogenous irreversibility, I com-
pute and calibrate three models: the baseline model with adverse selection, the fixed
irreversibility model, and the frictionless model. In the fixed irreversibility model,
the degree of irreversibility is a constant across time and state. Further, the fixed
irreversibility arises from capital specificity. That is, (1−pu) fraction of capital can
not be re-utilized by other plants. Appendix C.4 describes the model in detail. The
frictionless model is just the baseline model with q0 = 1, i.e., no bad capital in the
economy.
The model period is one year. Table A.9 summarizes the common para-
meters among the three models. The discount rate, β, is 0.977, which implies the
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annual interest rate is 4%. The growth rate r is set to be 1.016. The deprecia-
tion rate, δ, is chosen to match an average investment-capital ratio of 10.4%. The
parameters for preference and technology come from the calibration in Kahn and
Thomas (2008). The capital share, α, is 0.256. The labor share, ν, is 0.64. The sl
in the utility function is 2.4. The exogenous exit rate, η is selected to match capital
destruction from exiting firms of 1% in Becker, et al. (2004).
The aggregate shock is specified as an AR(1) process in logs, in which the
innovation vz has zero mean and variance σ2z .
logA′ = ρagglogA + v′z with v
′
z ∼ N(0, σ2z). (3.20)
This is an approximation of the aggregate shock in the model since ZA is compact.
The values of ρagg and σz come from Kahn and Thomas (2008). They estimate
the values from Solow residuals. The state space for aggregate shock has 11 grid
points. I employ seven nodes Gausee-Hermite Quadrature to compute the condi-
tional mean.
In specifying the idiosyncratic shock, I first assume a continuous shock fol-
lowing an AR(1) process in logs:
loga′ = ρidiologa + v′a with v
′
a ∼ N(0, σ2a). (3.21)
Then I discretize the process using the method from Tauchen (1986), and determine
the set of idiosyncratic shocks Za and the transition matrix, which restricts the evo-
lution of idiosyncratic shocks. Both ρidio and σz are set equal to the values in Kahn
and Thomas (2008).
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The rest of the parameters in the baseline model are the fraction of good cap-
ital in new output, q0, and the extra discount when exiting firms sell their capital, pc.
These parameters are selected to match the aggregate data moments. According to
Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES), the mean fraction of used capital ex-
penditure over total capital expenditure is 7.5% between 1995 to 2006. According
to Ramey and Shapiro (2001), the discount in the selling price of capital is between
41.9% and 83.66% for aerospace plants that closed in the 1990s. The two moments
are the target of the calibration exercise. In particular, the midpoint 0.6275 is used
as the discount of the selling price. In the fixed irreversibility model, the rest of pa-
rameters are pfu and pc. The calibration strategy and target moments are the same as
in the baseline model. In the frictionless model, I set pcu, the selling price discount
for the exiting plants , 0.6275.
The calibration procedure is similar to the simulated method of moments
with identity matrix. To find the parameters which replicate the evidences, I first
compute the model with aggregate uncertainty with an initial guess of parameters.
After finding the approximate laws of motions, I calculate the time-averaged frac-
tion of used capital expenditure and the discount for exiting plants. Then the sim-
ulated moments is compared with data moments and the guess is updated. A good
starting point is the calibration values from the model without aggregate shocks.
The moments in the model without aggregate shocks are close to the time-averaged
moments in the models with aggregate shocks. Given the calibration results from
the model without aggregate shocks, I compute the model with aggregate shocks
and use the approximate laws of motions as an initial guess for the later computa-
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tion.
Tables A.10 and A.11 present the main calibration results. q0 is 0.9972.
Even though the fraction of bad capital is low in new output, the endogenous used
capital price is about 0.95, which is close to the estimation in Cooper and Halti-
wanger(2006), 0.981. The calibration result for fixed irreversibility case is also
good. The figure in the fixed irreversibility model is 0.9824. The numerical exper-
iments later show that the fixed irreversibility model fails to match the procyclical
capital reallocation in data. It is worth noting that the fraction of used capital ex-
penditure in the frictionless model is about 28.68%, much higher than that in the
real data.
3.6 Results
Having established the consistencies of the fixed irreversibility model and
the baseline model with time-averages of macro and micro evidences, I now ex-
amine the aggregate implications between these two models, and the frictionless
model. When relative used capital price, is endogenously determined to clear the
markets for new goods, used goods and labor, along with the fluctuations of interest
rates and wages, the used capital price varies procyclically across time. The sales of
capital from incumbents fluctuate procyclically in the baseline model with adverse
selection, while the other two models do not replicate the procyclical sales con-
sistent with data. However, the main business cycle statistics are indistinguishable
between the baseline model and the frictionless counterpart. The long-run capital
accumulation is higher in the baseline model than that in the frictionless case.
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3.6.1 The Used Capital Price
3.6.1.1 The Cyclical Property of Used Capital Price
The baseline model differs from the frictionless model and fixed irreversibil-
ity model, as the relative used capital price, the measure of irreversibility, is state-
dependent. Panel C of Table A.13 presents the approximate laws of motions for
the baseline model. The second row in the panel displays the OLS estimations for
equation (3.18). The coefficient for aggregate shock, ck, is significantly positive,
−0.03308. The number in parentheses is the standard deviation of the estimate.
The coefficient for aggregate shock, cu, is significantly negative, −0.0351. The R
square is 0.9984, which indicates that the estimations approximate the true laws
of motions well. Thus the two forces, aggregate shock and aggregate good capital
stock, determine the evolution of used capital price over cycles.
The cyclical result is presented in Table A.17. Here I simulate the model
for 5,000 periods. The time-average of used capital price is 0.9503, which is very
close to the calibration result. The correlation of used capital price with output
is 0.1868. Thus, used capital price is procyclical. In other words, the endogenous
capital adjustment cost arising from adverse selection is countercyclical. This result
supports the conjecture in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
3.6.1.2 The Dynamics of Used Capital Price
Figure A.7 illustrates how the used capital price responds to a positive ag-
gregate shock. It plots the evolution of the log-deviations of the used capital price
from the steady state. Here, I simulate a model for 200 periods without aggregate
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shocks, then compute the used capital price with the time-averaged distribution. At
period 201, the economy is hit by a positive one standard deviation shock to aggre-
gate technology. The graph draws the log-deviation of the used capital price from
period 200 to period 219, which is period 1 to period 20 in the graph. In the graph,
the used capital price goes down immediately when hit by the positive shock. Then
the price increases sharply in the next period. After that, the used capital price goes
down with some slight bump during the process.
To understand the dynamics of the used capital price, I study the movements
of different forces which shift the used capital price separately, when facing a posi-
tive aggregate shock. In the model economy, the no-arbitrage condition in equation
(3.13), which reflects the interaction between new and used capital markets, deter-
mines the relative used capital price. From this equation, the consistent belief λ, the
stochastic discount factor β Ep
′
p
and the expectation of the used capital price Epu
vary over time. Here, the stochastic discount factor, d(A, µ), is the inverse of the





. The net interest rate is rt(A, µ).
Figure A.9 plots the impulse response functions for interest rate and real
expected used capital price β Ep
′p′u
p
. In the bottom panel, the interest rate first goes
down sharply since the positive aggregate technology shock increases the marginal
product of capital. It follows a deep drop because the economy accumulates an extra
amount of capital relative to the steady state. As the deviation of aggregate capital
decreases, the interest rate goes back to the steady state accordingly. The stochastic
discount factor moves inversely. During this process, the anticipated used capital
price is above the steady state level since the level of aggregate capital is above the
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steady state, as the law of motions for the used capital price indicates.
The top panel in Figure A.8 plots the corresponding impulse response func-
tion for consistent belief. In equilibrium, the consistent belief equals the fraction of
good capital sold in the used capital market. So, I first examine the response of the
target levels for selling good capital. The right panels in Figure A.10 describe the
evolutions of the target capital levels k∗2 given different idiosyncratic shocks after a
positive technology shock. At period 2, when hit by the positive shock, the target
capitals increase immediately, as do the threshold values. Thus, fewer firms would
sell their good capital, which corresponds to the decrease of the sales of good capi-
tal as shown in the bottom panel of figure A.8. At the same time, the target capital
levels for purchasing also increase, as shown in the left panel of figure A.8. The
firms hold more (good) capital stock than before. In the following periods, they
adjust their capital stocks gradually , and the target levels go back to the steady
state values during these periods. The sales of good capital increases accordingly.
It is worth noting that the sales of good capital increase dramatically at period 5,
because there are larger mass of firms which adjust their capital stocks downward.
As shown in figure A.10, the target levels for selling capital change slightly from
period 4 to period 5. So the increase of sales mainly comes from extensive margin
rather than intensive margin.
The response of used capital price combines all the above forces. With
a positive aggregate technology shock, the used capital price first goes down as
the interest rate goes up. To avoid the arbitrage between new and used markets,
the return on used capital has to increase. The decline of consistent belief also
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reinforces the negative response of used capital price at period 2. In the successive
period, the interest rate drops a lot, which shifts the used capital price upwards.
After period 2, the interest rate increases, which decreases the used capital price
accordingly. However, the quality of the used capital plays an important role in the
dynamics of used capital price. At period 5, more plants sell good capital. Thus the
quality of used capital increases, The higher quality induces the higher used capital
price at that period, which compensates for the opposite force from the interest rate.
3.6.2 Sales of Capital
This section studies the cyclical property of sales of capital. As described
before, the sales of property, plant, and equipment in Compustat data is positively
correlated with output from 197120 to 2006. Again, sales of capital refer to the sales
of used capital from all incumbents without any further notation. To compare the
model results with the data facts, I simulate the economy for 5000 periods, which is
about 136 simulations after dropping the initial 100 hundred periods. The same ex-
ercises are performed using the fixed irreversibility model and the frictionless model
to compare the cyclical implications of sales of capital among these models. Table
A summarizes the results. The corrleation in the baseline model is 0.3412, which
explains about 75.2% of the correlation in the data. Both the fixed irreversibility
model and the frictionless model do not replicate the procyclical sales of capital
from incumbents.
In the baseline model, the sales of capital from incumbents consist of two
20Compustat began to collect information about SPPE in 1971.
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parts: sales of good capital and sales of bad capital. As stated before, the incum-
bents sell all their bad capital since the average quality in the used capital market
is higher than the bad capital. As for the good capital, their decisions depend on
their idiosyncratic shocks, capital stocks, and aggregate states. The top panel in
figure A.8 plots the responses of aggregate sales of good capital when facing a one
standard deviation positive aggregate shock at period 2. The evolution of aggregate
sales of capital from incumbents is in figure A.11.
Figure A.11 indicates that the aggregate sales of capital first decline at pe-
riod 2, then go up at period 3. After that, the sales decrease gradually with an
exception of a jump at period 5. As shown in figure A.8, the drop at period 2 is
due to the increase in the sales of good capital, since the aggregate bad capital stock
does not change. At period 3, the sales of good capital almost return to the steady
state value. The sales of aggregate capital are above the steady state value since
plants accumulate more bad capital from the higher new investment in the previous
period. After that, the sales of bad capital decline along with the decrease of ag-
gregate capital stock. At period 5, the sales of good capital increase sharply, which
dominates the movement of aggregate sales of capital. From then on, sales of good
and bad capital both decline and approach to the level of steady state.
Figure A.13 compares the impulse response functions of incumbents’ sales
of capital among the baseline model, the fixed irreversibility model, and the fric-
tionless case. The solid line describes the evolution in the baseline model. The
slashed line represents the response of sales of capital in the frictionless model(no
capital adjustment cost). The dot-slashed line stands for the evolution in the fixed
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irreversibility model. In all these models, the sales of capital fall immediately after
a positive technology shock at period 2. After that they all go up, and then decrease
to the steady state level gradually.
In the frictionless model without capital adjustment cost, the target capital
level only depends on the firm’s idiosyncratic shock and aggregate states. In the
presence of a positive aggregate shock, the target levels for firms increase since the
marginal product of capital is higher than before. In the next period, the drop in
the marginal product results in the decline in interest rates and target capital levels.
Later on, the sales of capital go back to the steady state level as the interest rate
approaches the steady state. This argument is similar to the part of the explana-
tion from the perspective of interest rate in the baseline. In the fixed irreversibility
model, the explanations for the evolution of sales of capital are the same as those
in the frictionless case. The kink in the impulse response function reflects the non-
linearity of investment decisions.
Since the impulse response functions among three models have similar shapes,
why do they have different cyclical implications for the sales of capital? The an-
swer results from the magnitude. The response in the fixed irreversibility case is
the most volatile. The frictionless case is the second most volatile. As shown in fig-
ure A.13, output increases at period 2, then it almost goes back the level of steady
state. The small decline in the baseline model does not result in a large negative
relationship with output at this period. The persistent aggregate technology shock
also strengthens the positive correlation with sales of capital at a later period.
Figure A.13 compares the shifts of target levels between period 2, when
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facing a positive technology shock and period 1, the steady state. The two upper
panels describe the shifts in the fixed irreversibility case. The two lower panels
describe the movement in the baseline model. The solid line represents the targets
at period 1, the steady state before the shock. The dashed line represents the targets
after the shock at period 2. In the figure, the movements for two kinds of threshold
values, k∗1 and k
∗
2 , are significant in the case with fixed irreversibility for every
idiosyncratic shock level.
The shift in the target level can not explain the large differences among
responses21. In the baseline model, the response is even smaller than that in the
frictionless model. The explanation comes from the essence of the irreversibility
in the baseline model, lemons. Selling bad capital is one kind of subsidy. Plants
always sell all their bad capital no matter in good time or bad time. As the shift in
the target level only affects the sales of good capital, the whole impact on sales of
capital is small relative to other cases. The different responses of aggregate sales of
capital also provide an example where the micro-level non-linearity does matter for
macroeconomic analysis.
This paper aims to explain the procyclical sales of used capital after estab-
lishing the consistencies with evidences of selling price of used capital. However,
other explanations may be consistent with the procyclical sales of capital. For ex-
ample, the “vintage capital” implies that firms who invest in new capital sell their
21The difference may come from different levels of irreversibility between two models. I simulate
a fixed irreversibility model where pfu is set to 0.95, the time-averaged used capital price in the
baseline model. In this experiment, the response to shock is also large and the correlation of sales
of capital is still counter cyclical.
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used capital. Therefore, the more investment in a good state, the more sales of used
capital in a good state. However, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) shows that the impli-
cation of vintage capital is not consistent with the data, since firms selling capital
do not invest more than those firms who do not sell in Compustat data.22
3.6.3 Fraction of Used Capital Expenditure
In the model economy, the fraction of used capital expenditure over total
capital expenditure is counter cyclical though both new and used capital invest-
ment23 are procyclical. The correlation of the fraction with output is 0.7038. Data
evidences also support the countercyclical fraction. Although there are only 11 ob-
servations in ACES, the corresponding correlation is significantly positive, -0.5353.
The correlation is -0.5188 when using 2-digit industry level data in ACES from
1998 to 2006. Figure A.14 plots the evolution of the fraction of used capital ex-
penditure over total capital expenditure. The fraction first drops deeply since less
used capital is available in the used capital market while the demand for investment
increases. In period 3, the fraction of used capital expenditure goes up, as the plants
accumulate extra capital when facing the positive aggregate shock. Later, the frac-
tion decreases but it is still above the steady state for a few periods. The fraction
remains above the steady state because the higher aggregate capital stock implies
22 As stated in their paper, “the median lagged property, plant and equipment ratio for firms selling
PP&E is 21% , for those who do not sell PP&E is 23%.
23Here the used capital investment is the sum of sales from incumbents and sales from exiting
firms. Since the exit rate is exogenous, the increased capital stock implies that the sales from exiting
firms are high when the aggregate shock is high. In the model, the correlation of used capital
expenditure with output is 0.4930.
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higher sales of capital from exiting plants.
3.6.4 New Investment
As stated in Kahn and Thomas (2003, 2008) and Veracierto (2002), the nu-
merical results in this paper confirm that the conventional business cycle moments
are indistinguishable between the frictionless model and the model with micro-level
non-linearity, i.e., the model with endogenous irreversibility. Table A.14 reports the
business cycle statistics from the frictionless model and the baseline model. Most
of the figures are very close between the two model results except the figure for the
standard deviation of new investment with respect to output. In the frictionless case,
it is 3.5274, while it is 3.181 in the model with adverse selection. The decline of
volatility of investment results from the adjustment cost in the baseline model. The
standard deviation of investment is 6.9238 in the frictionless model, and 6.2108 in
the baseline model. The ratio is 0.8970 when the used capital price is 0.95.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with two
separate capital markets and asymmetric information in the used capital market.
The investment is partially reversible as selling good capital faces extra costs aris-
ing from information friction. The capital adjustment cost, measured as the level
of irreversibility, is endogenously determined by plant investment decisions. Un-
like the physical adjustment cost, the cost arising from the information problem
is countercyclical. When calibrating the model with time-averaged moments, the
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model replicates the procyclical sales of capital from incumbents in the data. How-
ever, the model with fixed irreversibility or a frictionless model fails to explain this
phenomenon. The striking difference on the moment for aggregate sales of capital
provides an example that micro-level non-linearity is important in understanding
the movement of macroeconomic variables.
The present paper also proposes a framework to study the impact of eco-
nomic stimulus on capital reallocation, since the time-variant used capital price
connects the new and used capital markets. When the government imposes invest-
ment tax credit to stimulate aggregate (new) investment during recessions, the cost
of the new investment decreases. According to the no-arbitrage requirement be-
tween new and used capital markets, the used capital price must decrease. Thus,
plants do not want to sell good capital as much as before. The sales and the quality
of used capital decrease. As small firms invest more on used capital, this kind of
policies hinders the recovery of small firms in recessions. Therefore, the policy-
makers should take into account the impact on capital reallocation when employing
stimulating policies for new investment.
In the present paper, I assume that every firm invests the same fraction of
capital on used goods. By abstracting the heterogeneity among firms, I focus on
analyzing the impact of adverse selection on capital reallocation. According to
ACES, small firms invest more on used capital. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) use
micro-level evidence to show that small firms intend to invest more on used capital
because of credit constraints. Thus, it would be interesting to explore the quanti-
tative impact of credit constraints on capital reallocation in a DSGE model, where
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Table A.1: Inaction Rates, Profit Shocks and GDP (1974 - 1988)
YEAR 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
inacta 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Profshk 4.16 4.08 4.16 4.21 4.24 4.23 4.14 4.11
LGDPCA 8.37 8.37 8.42 8.47 8.52 8.55 8.55 8.57
YEAR 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
inacta 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10
Profshk 4.00 4.03 4.08 4.04 4.02 4.03 4.04
LGDPCA 8.55 8.60 8.67 8.71 8.74 8.78 8.82
Note: The rows “inacta” represent the fraction of inactive plants each year. Plants
are inactive when their (positive or negative )investment rates are less than 0.01.
The rows “Profshk” stands for the average profit shocks each year. Both “inacta”
and “Profshk” are calculated based on LRD database. These figures are provided
by John Haltiwanger. Please refer to Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) on the details
of the estimation of profit shocks and the calculation of investment rates. The rows
“LGDPCA” are the logarithm of real GDP per year. These data is from FRED
database.
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Table A.2: Adjustment cost estimates
Parameter Estimate
ν 0.0308
Coefficient of convex adjustment cost (0.002)
α1 32.06
Coefficient of Irreversibility (1.915)
α2 -36.07
Coefficient of Cyclical Irreversibility (2.116)
λ 0.8370
Coefficient of non-convex adjustment cost (0.006)
Moments Data Simulated
Serial correlation of Investment Rates 0.058 0.051
Correlation of Profit Shocks and Investment 0.143 0.161
Positive Investment larger than 20% 0.186 0.130
Negative Investment larger than 20% 0.018 0.050
Correlation of Average Profit Shocks and Inaction -0.713 -0.710
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Figure A.1: Fraction of Inactive Plants Over the Cycles

















Description Parameters Baseline values
Discount rate β 0.950
Curvature of profit function α 0.5920
Depreciation rate δ 0.069
High level of aggregate uncertainty Ah 1.015
Low level of aggregate uncertainty Al 0.985





Persistence of idiosyncratic shocks ρidio 0.885
Standard deviation of idio. innovations σidio 0.300
Fraction of good capital in new output q0 0.6794
Ratio of productivity of used K to new K φ 0.3958
Initial new capital stock k0 1.370
Table A.4: Calibration for Non-standard Parameters
Parameters Baseline Target Moments Model Data
q0 0.6794 Fraction of used K expenditure 0.073158 0.073158
φ 0.3958 Entry rate 0.0144 0.0144
k0 1.370 Fraction of inactive plants 0.0163 0.081
Table A.5: Correlation with Aggregate Uncertainty
pu λ Iu In x
Baseline 0.4988 0.4972 0.5537 0.4972 -0.5115
This table shows the correlation coefficients between equilibrium outcomes and
aggregate uncertainty which includes used capital price pu, consistent belief λ, ag-
gregate used and capital expenditure Iu and In. These results based on the 10000-
period simulation of the baseline economy. The first 100 periods are dropped.
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Table A.6: Sensitivity Analysis: Correlation with Aggregate Uncertainty
πhh = πll pu λ Iu In
0.65 0.2969 0.2950 0.6319 0.2950
0.70 0.3902 0.3884 0.5613 0.3884
0.75 0.4990 0.4972 0.5537 0.4972
0.77 0.5379 0.5364 0.5373 0.5364
The table presents the correlations of used capital price pu, consistent belief λ, used
and new capital expenditure Iu, In with aggregate uncertainty when varying πhh
and πll. πhh and πll are the probabilities to keep the current uncertainty level next
period.
Table A.7: Robustness
q0 φ k0 Corr(pu,shock)
0.8 0.3958 1.37 0.4996
0.6794 0.4 1.37 0.4988
0.6794 0.3512 0.8 0.5005
0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4978
The table presents the correlation of used capital price with aggregate uncertainty
with different (q0, φ, k0). The other parameterizations are the same as the baseline
values.
Table A.8: The correlation of SPPE with Output
HP-filter Linear Trend
Correlation of SPPE with Output 0.4479 0.4537
Significance Level (0.0055) (0.0062)
This table describes the cyclical property of sales of property,plant and equipment
in Compustata , which is deflated by the CPI. The natural logarithm of the variable
is used to compute the deviation from trend with HP filter or a linear trend. The
significance level for each estimate is in the parentheses.
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Figure A.2: Equilibrium Outcomes when varying K̄g and A




























This graph plots used capital price, pu and consistent belief, λ when varying K̄g
and A. The aggregate state rKb = 0.3215. The dotted lines are those with low
aggregate uncertainty level. Solid lines are those corresponding to high aggregate
uncertainty level. The graph only shows a fraction of the function.
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Figure A.3: Equilibrium Outcomes when varying rKb and A





























This graph plots used capital price, pu and consistent belief, λ when varying rKb
and A. The aggregate state K̄g = 62.77. The dotted lines are those with low
aggregate uncertainty level. Solid lines are those corresponding to high aggregate
uncertainty level. The graph only shows a fraction of the function.
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Figure A.4: Solutions to Plants’ Problems















































This graph describes two side (s, S) rules of plants’ investment decisions in steady
states. The blue line is plants’ initial capital stock after selling all of their bad
capital, k0q0(1 − δ). The green line plots the optimal choice for the efficiency
units of capital k̃′t next period when selling good capital, K2(a). The red line plots
the optimal choice for the efficiency units of capital next period when purchasing
capital, K1(a). a1 and a2 are two cutoff values in Proposition 2.3.4.
Parameterizations: β = 0.81707, α = 0.592; δ = 0.46138; ρidio = 0.885; σidio =
0.30; At = 1.03; q0 = 0.70; φ = 0.4; k0 = 0.9158. Discrete the idiosyncratic shocks
with Tauchen’s method with 40 grids. This graph shows the previous 34 grids.
Equilibrium: pu = 0.9616; λ = 0.6061; x = 0.8417.
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Table A.9: Parameterizations(Annual)
Description Parameters Baseline values
Discount rate β 0.977
Growth rate r 0.016
Depreciation rate δ 0.088
Capital’s share α 0.2560
Labor’s share ν 0.64
Preference parameters for leisure sl 2.4
Persistence of idio. shocks ρidio 0.859
Standard deviation of idio. innovations σidio 0.022
Persistence of aggregate shocks ρagg 0.859
Standard deviation of aggregate innovations σagg 0.014
Exit rate η 0.01
Table A.10: Calibration for Non-standard Parameters: Baseline Model
Para. Baseline Target Moments Model Data
q0 0.9972 Fraction of used K expenditure 0.0747 0.0750
pc 0.6605 Discount of Selling Prices from exiter 0.6275 0.6275
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Table A.11: Calibration for Non-standard Parameters: Fixed Irr. Model
Para. Baseline Target Moments Model Data
pu 0.9824 Fraction of used capital expenditure 0.0750 0.0750
pc 0.6387 Discount of Selling Prices from exiter 0.6275 0.6275
Table A.12: The degree of Irreversibility in models and estimation
Baseline Fixed Irr. Frictionless CH(2006) Data
Used K price 0.9501 0.9824 1 0.981 N/A
Frac. of used K 7.474% 7.502% 28.68% N/A 7.502%
Table A.13: Approximate Laws of Motions
i ai bi ci R2
Panel A: Frictionless
k -0.0166 0.7576 0.5259 0.9999
(0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0011)
p 0.9046 -0.3838 -0.67806 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Panel B: Fixed
k -0.0063 0.7593 0.6026 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0007)
p 0.9259 -0.3807 -0.6187 1.0000
( 0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Panel C: Baseline
k -0.0078 0.7604 0.5162 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0003) ( 0.0006)
u -0.0499 0.03308 -0.0351 0.9984
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
p 0.9244 -0.3800 -0.6854 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
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Table A.14: Conventional RBC Moments
Corr w.r.t output STD relative to output
In N C In N C
Frictionless 0.9692 0.9437 0.9124 3.5274 0.5949 0.4808
Baseline 0.9726 0.9449 0.9183 3.181 0.5868 0.4852
Table A.15: Correlations of Sales of Capital with Output
Endo. Irr Frictionless Fixed Irr.
corr(Iu, Y) 0.3412 -0.2508 -0.7517
Table A.16: Long-run Statistics
Frictionless Fixed Irr. Baseline
Mean of capital 0.9192 0.9628 0.9544
Table A.17: Used Capital Price and Fraction of Used K Expenditure
Mean of pu Corr(pu,Y) Corr(xfrac, Y)
Baseline Model 0.9503 0.1868 -0.7038
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Figure A.5: Sales of Capital over the Cycle

























Figure A.6: Timing of the Model
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Figure A.7: Impulse Response Functions for Used Capital Price























This graph plots log-deviation of used capital price from steady state values when
there is one standard deviation of aggregate technology shock at period 2. Here
“steady date” indicates that values comes from time-average distribution where I
simulate the model for 200 periods without aggregate shocks.
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Figure A.8: Impulse Response Functions for Belief and Sales of Good Capital
















































This upper panel plots log-deviation of consistent belief and the bottom panel plots
sales of good capital. Here “steady date” and the shock process are the same as
those in the previous graph.
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Figure A.9: Impulse Response Functions for Interest Rates and Expected Price








































The upper panel plots log-deviation of expected real used capital price, and the
bottom panel plots the log-deviation of interest rates. Here “steady date” and the
shock process are the same as those in the previous graphs.
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Figure A.10: Impulse Response Functions for Target Level
































































































This graph plots log-deviations of two target capital level in the baseline model:
k∗1 and k
∗
2 . The left six panels describe the responses of the low threshold values,
k∗1 . The right six panels describe the responses of the upper threshold values, k
∗
2 .
a from 1 to 6 indicates the level of idiosyncratic shocks from low to high. Here
“steady date” and the shock process are the same as those in the previous graphs.
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Figure A.11: Impulse Response Functions for Sales of Capital































This graph plots log-deviation of sales of capital in the baseline model. Here “steady
date” and the shock process are the same as those in the previous graphs.
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Figure A.12: Thresholds Before and After Shocks



































































































This graph plots variations of target capital levels of selling and buying capital
before and after one standard deviation of aggregate technology shock. The “before
shock” values come from steady state values. The “Steady State” is the same as
in previous graphs. The solid lines stand for threshold values before shock. The
slashed lines stand for values after shocks. The upper panels are the case with fixed
irreversibility. The lower panels are the case with adverse selection.
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Figure A.13: Impulse Response Functions for Sales of Capital



































This graph plots log-deviation of sales of capital from steady state values when there
is one standard deviation of aggregate technology shock at period 2. The “Steady
State” is the same as in previous graphs. The solid line stand for those from baseline
model. The slashed line stands for those from frictionless model. The dot-slashed
line stands for those from model with fixed irreversibility.
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Figure A.14: Impulse Response Functions for xfrac and K̄g














































The upper panel in this graph plots log-deviations of fraction of used capital expen-
diture from steady state values. The bottom panel plots the impulse response for
aggregate good capital stock. The “Steady State” and shocks are the same as stated
in previous graphs.
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Figure A.15: Impulse Response Functions for Aggregate Variables





























































































This graph plots log-deviation of aggregate quantities from steady state values when
there is one standard deviation of aggregate technology shock at period 2. Here
“steady date” indicates that values come from time-average distribution where I
simulate the model for 200 periods without aggregate shocks. The solid lines stand
for those from baseline model. The circles stand for those from frictionless model.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Denote I tg the aggregate sales of good capital from young plants
in the used capital market at period t. I tb is the aggregate sales of bad capital from
young plants in the used capital market at period t. I tu stands for the total used
capital expenditure of young plants at period t. I tn represents the total new capital
expenditure of young plants at period t. Kd,tg = k0q0(1 − δ) − I tg is the aggregate
good capital stock of young plants at period t.
Obviously, λt > 0 which comes from the assumption that old plants are












































≤ q0. ∵ I1u = I1g + I1b + (1− δ)(K̄0g + K̄0b ), λ1I1u =














































































































Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. Since
∫
in,t−1(a)dF > 0 in an equilibrium with pos-
itive aggregate investment, there always exists some fraction of good capital and
some fraction of bad capital. Thus λt ∈ (0, 1) according to the condition of consis-
tent belief.
In the used capital market at period t, the old plants sell (1 − δ)(K̄t−1g ) +



























≤ q0, ∴ λt < q0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. Let the plant choose (k̃′, iu, ig, ib), in = 1q̄ (k̃
′ − iuλ̄ −
k0(1 − δ)q̄ + ig + ib). in ≥ 0. Now, the objective function of plants’ problem is
concave and the constraint set is convex. A local maximum is a also global maxi-
mum. Kuhn-Tucker conditions fully characterize the solutions of the maximization
problem. Let µ1, µ2, µ3, µ5 be Lagrange Multipliers for non-negative constraints of
in,t, iu,t, ig,t, ib,t respectively and µ4, µ6 be Lagrange Multipliers for constraints of















− pu,t + Eβpu,t+1(1− δ)− µ1 λ̄
q̄


















From equation (B.1), µ1 1q̄ =
1
q̄
− aβEAt+1k̃′α−1−Eβpu,t+1 1q̄ (1− δ). Plug this into
equation (B.2),(B.3) and (B.4). I have the follow equations:
iu,t : −pu,t + Eβpu,t+1(1− δ) + λ̄EaAt+1αk̃′α−1 + µ2 = 0 (B.5)
ig,t : pu,t − aαEβAt+1k̃′α−1t − Eβpu,t+1(1− δ) + µ3 − µ4 = 0 (B.6)
ib,t : pu,t − aαEβAt+1k̃′α−1t φ− Eβpu,t+1(1− δ) + µ5 − µ6 = 0 (B.7)
(B.1) ∗ λ̄t − (B.5) ⇒ − λ̄tq̄ + pu,t + Eβpu,t+1(1 − δ)( λ̄tq̄ − 1) + µ1 λ̄tq̄ − µ2 = 0.
Thus an equilibrium with aggregate positive new and used capital investment must
satisfy the no-arbitrage condition.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. The low bound comes from no-arbitrage condition. Only
need to show the upper bound. From equation (B.1), aαEβAt+1k̃′
α−1
t q̄ > 0,
µ1 ≥ 0, thus Eβpu,t+1(1 − δ) − 1 < 0. Rearrange the no-arbitrage condition,
pu,t < 1.
Lemma 5. in,t(a)ig,t(a) = 0; iu,t(a)ig,t(a) = 0; ib,t = (1− δ)k0(1− q0), ∀a, t.
Proof of Lemma 5. (B.5)+(B.7)⇒ aαEβAt+1k̃′α−1t (λ̄t − φ) + µ2 + µ5 − µ6 = 0.
∵ λ̄t > φ, µ6 > 0. ∴ ib,t = k0(1− δ)(1− q0).
(B.5)+(B.6)⇒ aαEβAt+1k̃′α−1t (λ̄t−1)+µ2+µ3−µ4 = 0. ∵ λ̄t < 1, ig,t and
iu,t can’t be interior solutions simultaneously. Since in,t(a) and iu,t(a) have to be
both positive or both zero, ig,t and in,t can’t be interior solutions simultaneously,too.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3.4. Since new and used capital are perfect substitutes, I as-
sume buyers buy the same fraction of new and used capital. That is, plants choose
i0,t = in,tq̄ + iu,tλ̄t where iu,t = xtλ̄t and in,t =
1−xt
q̄
. xt ∈ (0, 1) which is determined
in equilibrium. Given the plant’s idiosyncratic shock, I first find the cut-off value





t = 0 (B.8)
That is k̃′t = k0q0(1− δ).
āt =
pu,t − Eβpu,t+1(1− δ)
λ̄tαEβAt+1(k0q0(1− δ))α−1
Define the cutoff value a
¯t









< āt. When a > āt, the marginal benefit of investment is higher
than its marginal cost, the plant then invest. When a ≤ āt, the plant does not
invest. When a < a
¯t
, the price-the resale value-of capital is higher than its marginal
product, the plant sells its good capital. Otherwise, it doesn’t adjust its capital.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.5. (monotonicity)Pick f, g ∈ B(S) and f(X) ≤ g(X),









β(1− δ) ∈ (0, 1). Thus
satisfy Blackwell’s sufficient conditions.
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B.2 Two idiosyncratic shock case
This section studies the steady state of a model with two idiosyncratic shocks.
Suppose half of plants face high idiosyncratic shock ah, half have low idiosyncratic
shock al. The following proposition provides a sufficient condition for the existence
of equilibrium.





















an equilibrium with aggregate positive investment exists. In particular, the young
plants with high shocks purchase capital while those with low shocks only sell their
bad capital.
Proof. Suppose plants with low plants only sell bad capital and plants with high
shocks purchase good capital. The used market clearing condition, consistency
condition for belief and no-arbitrage condition are as follows:
xi0
λ̄





)i0(1− δ) + 2k0q0(1− δ)2 (B.9)
λxi0
λ̄

































1−q0 − i02k0(1−q0)q̄ . Obviously, F (0) < 0, ∃ε >
0 such that F (q0 − ε) > 0. Thus exist an equilibrium. Now need to show the











1− q0 + q0(1− δ) < 1
Therefore x > 0. To have x < 1, need to show λ < λ0 =
q0(1−δ)
1−q0δ . It is sufficient
to show F (λ0) > 0. With the conditions in the proposition, only high shock plants
buy capital and low shock plants only sell bad capital. And F (λ0) > 0.
B.3 Numerical Details
The detailed computation algorithm is as follows:
1. Find an initial guess of H01 (X̃) and H
0
2 (X̃).
2. • Guess λ0(X̃), compute the corresponding p0u(X̃) according to (2.6).
• Solve the young plants’ problem given pu and λ.
• Compute λ1(X̃) according to (2.7) and (2.8). If λ1 = λ0, stop. Other-
wise update λ0 and continue to iterate until it converges.
• Compute the corresponding x(X̃).
3. Compute H01 (X̃) and H
0
2 (X̃) from (2.9) and (2.10). Go back to step 1 and
update H01 and H
0
2 if they do not converge.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Data Appendix
Macroeconomic data: Annual real GDP is from Table GDPCA1 in Bureau
of Economic Analysis. This table includes the time series of natural logarithm of
real gross GDP in billions of 2000 dollars from 1971 to 2006. Annual CPI data is
for all urban consumers (current series) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Sales of Property, Plant and Equipment: Data on Sales of Property, Plant
and Equipment is from Compustat North America in Wharton Research Data Ser-
vices (WRDS) between 1971 and 2006. The data item is SPPE in Fundamentals
Annual in its website (http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/comp/index.
shtml). In Compustat, the data reporting period is fiscal year. If a company’s fiscal-
year-end is June 30, the annual data in 2004 represents the sales for six months of
2003 and six months of 2004. To explore the cyclical property more precisely, I as-
sign the sales of each company into two years, which represent the fraction of sales
happening in the calendar year, among the sales of the total fiscal year, if the end
of fiscal year is not the same as the end of calendar year. In the above example, the
sales in 2004 for the company incude half from the report in 2004 and half from the
report in 2005 when I adjust the data. I exclude the observations with a combined
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figure code and observations outside America.
Fraction of Used Capital Expenditure: The mean fraction is calculated with
data in Annual Capital Expenditure Survey(ACES) between 1995 and 2005. The
formula for computing the fraction, xfrac, is
xfrac =
Uequ + Ustrc
Uequ + Ustrc + Nequ + Nstrc
(C.1)
where Uequ is used equipment expenditure, Ustrc is used structure expenditure, Nequ
is new equipment expenditure and Nstrc is new structure expenditure. These data
come from tables in annual reports. In particular, they are table 1 in 1995 report,
table 1.b in 1997, table 1.b in 1998, table 1.c in 1999 and table 1.b in 2000-2006.
Columbia Industrial Survey: The sales of fixed assets used in the paper are
the sum of values for sales of fixed assets excluding lands: building and structures
(I24), machinery and equipment(I25), transportation equipment (I26), office equip-
ment (I27). The data item for total employment is L1.
C.2 Proofs
Assumption 2. p(A, µ), pu(A, µ) are bounded continuous functions. (A, µ) ∈
ZA ×D.
As the production function is unbounded, I restrict the state space first. The
first step is to construct a “help” model whose feasible set contains that in the prob-
lem (3.2). I find the boundary of the “help” model and apply the feasible correspon-
dence for the rest of the paper.
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In the “help” model, I model the exit shock as a zero technology shock with
Pr(ai > 0|a = 0) = 0 and Pr(ai = 0|a = 0) = 1. Denote Z0a = {0, a1, ...ana}.
S̃ = Eg × Eb × Z0a . The new transition function is Q0 which is monotone and has
feller property by assumption. The difference from the benchmark model is that the
plant with zero productivity shock can choose when to exit the market and liquidate
its capital. Thus to exit immediately in the benchmark model is one choice in the
“help” model.
F = f(kg, a, A)−
rk′g
q0 − λ(1− λ− pu(1− q0)) +
rk′b
q0 − λ(λ− puq0)
+
ib
q0 − λ(λ(1− pu)) +
kg(1− δ)
q0 − λ (1− λ− pu(1− q0))
−kb(1− δ)
q0 − λ (λ− puq0)−
ig
q0 − λ(1− λ− pu(1− λ))
The rest of the “help” model is the same as the benchmark model.
The upper bound of capital stock is the level next period which can’t reim-
burse the output and capital stock in this period. Let am and Am be the maximums
in Z0a and ZA. Let p
m
u be the upper bound of pu(µ,A). I define k
m
g such that
f(kmg , am, Am)− (rkmg − kmg (1− δ)) 1q0−λ(1− λ− pmu (1− q0)) = 0. When λ < q0,
1
q0−λ(1 − λ − pmu (1 − q0)) > 0. Then the above term is negative if k′g > kmg . De-
note k0g and k
0
b be the maximums of initial good and bad capital stocks. The upper
bound k̄g = max(kmg , k
0
g). From equation (3.1), in and iu are bounded since in ≥ 0,
iu ≥ 0. The bounds are In and Iu. From equation (3.1), k′b is also bounded given k0b
as in and iu are bounded. Denote the upper bound for k′b as k̄b.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. Let C(X) be a space of bounded and continuous func-
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tions. For v ∈ C(X), I define the following operator,












Tv is bounded. I apply the Maximum Theorem to show the continuity of Tv.
The first step is show that Γ is non-empty, compact-valued, continuous. Pick
x = (s, A, µ) ∈ X . Γ is non-empty because (0, 0, kg(1 − δ), kb(1 − δ)) ∈ Γ(x).
Now to prove Γ(x) is compact-valued. Since Y is compact, Γ(x) ⊂ Y , need to
prove Γ(x) is closed. Given x, in(x) is continuous. Define Γ1(x) = {y ∈ Y :
in ≥ 0}. ∀{yn} ⊂ Γ1(x), with {yn} → y0, in(yn) ≥ 0, thus in(y0) ≥ 0. Then
Γ1(x) is closed. Similarly define Γ2(x) = {y ∈ Y : iu ≥ 0}. It is also closed.
Γ(x) = Γ1(x) ∩ Γ2(x) is closed.
To prove Γ is continuous, I need to show it is both l.h.c and u.h.c. For
l.h.c, I need to show ∀y ∈ Γ(x), ∀xn → x, ∃yn → y and yn ∈ Γ(xn). Pick
x = (kg, kb, a, A, µ), y = (k′g, k
′











kg > 0 and kb > 0, let ν1 =
ig
kg(1−δ) , ν2 =
ib
kb(1−δ) . y3n = ign = ν1kgn(1 − δ).
y4n = ibn = ν2kbn(1 − δ). Thus limy3n → y3, limy4n → y4. Let y1n = k′gn =
kgn(1−δ)−ign+(inq0+iuλ), y2n = k′bn = kbn(1−δ)−ibn+in(1−q0)+iu(1−λ).






b. When kg = 0, let ign = 0.
The rest of argument is the same.
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For u.h.c., need to show ∀xn → x, ∀{yn} ∈ Γ(xn), ∃ a subsequence {ynk}
such that lim
nk→0
ynk ∈ Γ(x). Since Y is compact, {yn} ∈ Y always has a convergent
subsequence ynk. Now need to show y = limynk ∈ Γ(x). ynk ∈ Γ(xnk), then
y3,nk ∈ [0, x1,nk(1−δ)],y4,nk ∈ [0, x2,nk(1−δ)],in,nk ≥ 0 and iu,nk ≥ 0. Since in and
iu are continuous, y ∈ Γ(x). Since x is arbitrarily picked, Γ is non-empty,compact
valued, continuous.
The first term on the right-hand side of (C.2) is continuous as F , p and pu












′, A′n, µ′n)Q(a,An, da′, dA′)








































′, A′, µ′)Q(a,A, da′, dA′)|
The second term vanishes because Q has Feller property. The first term also disap-




A′n, µ′n) → (k′g, k′b, a′, A′, µ′), there is a compact set D ⊂ X such that (k′ng , k′nb , a′,
A′n, µ′n) ∈ D and (k′g, k′b, a′, A′, µ′) ∈ D for all n large enough. Since v is continu-
ous, it is uniform continuous in D. Thus ∀ ε > 0, there exit N > 1 such that for all
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n > N , |v(k′ng , k′nb , a′, A′n, µ′n)− v(k′g, k′b, a′, A′, µ′)| < ε. Thus the first term van-
ishes too. Thus the second term in the right-hand side of (C.2) is continuous. The
argument for the continuity of last term in (C.2) is the same. Thus Tv is continuous
by the Maximum Theorem. T : C(X) → C(X).
T satisfies the Blackwell sufficient conditions thus it is a contraction map-
ping. After applying the contraction mapping theorem, the problem (3.2) has a
unique fixed point v ∈ C(X).
Now I change the state and control variables as follows:k = kg + kb, state
variables are y2(k, kg, a, A, µ)
∈ X2 = [0, K̄] × [0, k̄g] × Z ×D, control variables are (k′, k′g, in, iu) ∈ Y2. Y2 =
[0, K̄]× [0, k̄g]× [0, In]× [0, Iu], Γ(y2) = {y ∈ Y2 : kg(1− δ)+ inq0 + iuλ− rk′g ∈
[0, kg(1−δ)]; (k−kg)(1−δ)+in(1−q0)+iu(1−λ)−r(k′−k′g) ∈ [0, (k−kg)(1−δ)]}.
The recursive problem (FE2) is as follows:
v(k, kg, a; A, µ) = maxy∈Γ(x2)(f(kg, a, A) + (pu − 1)in + puk(1− δ)− purk′)p
+ β(1− η)(1− δ)k′E(p′up′)pc + βη
∫
v(k′, k′g, a
′; A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2. Under my assumption, the integration preserves the
boundedness, monotonicity and concavity. Obviously, the FE2 has unique solu-
tion v ∈ C(X2). Now need to prove v is strictly increasing in the second element
kg. I will use the Corollary 1 of the contraction mapping theorem in Stockey and
Lucas(1989)(SL). Let v ∈ C ′(X2) where C ′(X2) is the space of continuous and
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(weakly)increasing functions. Then,
Tv(k, kg, a; A, µ) = max
(k′,k′g ,in,iu,n)
{(aAf(kg) + (pu − 1)in + puk(1− δ)− purk′)p
+ β(1− η)(1− δ)k′E(p′up′)pc + βη
∫
v(k′, k′g, a
′; A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)}




′; A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)
where (k̃′, k̃′g, ĩn, ĩu) ∈ argmax
(k′,k′g ,in,iu,n)
(f(kg, a, A)+(pu−1)in+puk(1−δ)−purk′)p+
β(1− η)(1− δ)k̃′E(p′up′)pc + βη
∫
v(k′, k′g, a
′; A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′).
Take k̂g > kg, then,
Tv(k, kg, a; A, µ) < (aAf(k̂g) + (pu − 1)̃in + puk(1− δ)− purk̃′)p
+ β(1− η)(1− δ)k̃′E(p′up′)pc+
βη
∫
v(k̃′, (k̃′g + (1− δ)(k̂g − kg)), a′; A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)
≤ max
(k̂′,k̂′g ,̂in ,̂iu)
{(aAf(k̂g) + (pu − 1)̂in + puk(1− δ)− purk̂′)p
+ β(1− η)(1− δ)k̂′E(p′up′) + βη
∫
v(k̂′, k̂′g, a
′; A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)}
= Tv(k, k̂g, a; A, µ)
Note (k′, k̂′g + (1 − δ)(k̂g − kg), in, iu) ∈ Γ(k, k̂g, a; A, µ) since ig is the same as
before. Hence T : C ′(X2) → C ′′(X2) where C ′′(X2) is the space of continuous
and increasing function, strictly increasing in the second element. Therefore v ∈
C ′′(X2).
Suppose y∗ = (k′, k′g, in, iu) ∈ Γ(x2) is the optimal solution. Define ig =
kg(1−δ)+inq0+iuλ−rk′g, ib = (k−kg)(1−δ)+in(1−q0)+iu(1−λ)−r(k′−k′g);
Then ig ∈ [0, kg(1− δ)] and ib ∈ [0, (k − kg)(1− δ)].
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If ib < (k − kg)(1 − δ), pick an arbitrarily small ε such that ib + ε < (k −
kg)(1− δ). Let the plant sell ε unit of bad capital and buy the same amount of used
capital. Then (k′, k′g + ελ, in, Iu + ε) ∈ Γ(x2), the correspond in is unchanged. But
v(k′, k′g + ελ, a
′; A′, µ′) > v(k′, k′g, a
′; A′, µ′) if λ > 0. As the integration preserves
monotonicity1.
∫
v(k′, k′g + ελ, z




y∗ is not optimal. Contradiction.
If ig > 0 and iu > 0, pick an arbitrarily small ε such that ig − ε ≥ 0 and
iu−ε ≥ 0. Consider the act: decrease the sales of good capital by ε unit and decrease
the purchase of used capital by the same amount. Then (k′, k′g + ε(1 − λ), in, iu −
ε) ∈ Γ(x2), ib is unchanged. Since v(k′, k′g + ε(1 − λ), z′, µ′) > v(k′, k′g, z′, µ′),
∫
v(k′, k′g+ε(1−λ), z′, µ′)Q(z, dz′) >
∫
v(k′, k′g, z
′, µ′)Q(z, dz′). y∗ is not optimal.
Contradiction .
Since plants sell all their bad capital, I plug ib = kb(1 − δ) in to equation
(3.2) and have a new one period return function F1(kg, kg, k′g, k
′
b, ig, a; A, µ):
F1 = (f(kg, a, A)−
rk′g
q0 − λ(1− λ− pu(1− q0)) +
rk′b
q0 − λ(λ− puq0))p
+
kg(1− δ)
q0 − λ (1− λ− pu(1− q0))p−
ig
q0 − λ(1− λ− pu(1− λ))p
+ kb(1− δ)pu + β(1− η)(k′g + k′b)(1− δ)E(p′up′)pc
Proof of Lemma 3. Pick an arbitrary (a,A, µ) ∈ Z ×D. Denote x = (kg, kb), y =
(k′g, k
′
b, ig). Let v
n(x; a,A, µ) be the nth-iteration value function. For convenient,
1The proof is similar to the lemma 9.5 in SL.
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Define the following operator,




vn(x′; a′, A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)
Need to show T : C1(X) → C1(X). C1(X) is the space for continuous functions
and partially differentiable with respect to the 2nd element of x, or kb. Obvious, the
solution of problem is associated with a saddle point for the Lagrangian function.
Ln(x, y, a, A, µ, m) = F1+βη
∫




where m = (m1,m2). m1 is the Lagrangian multiplier for in ≥ 0, g1 = in. µ2 is the
Lagrangian multiplier for iu ≥ 0, g2 = iu. The constrained maximization problem
can be represented as a saddle-point problem for the Lagrangian function. That’s
because F , vn are concave, Eg ×Eb × [0, k̄g(1− δ)] and the constraints are convex
and I can easily find a ŷ such that in > 0,iu > 0. The value of the constrained
maximization problem equals the saddle value of the Lagrangian function.
Tv(x; a,A, µ) = minm≥0maxy Ln(x, y, a, A, µ, m)
Next I show that Ln is partially differentiable with respect to kb. Pick x∗ ∈ int(Eg×
Eb). Pick a x′ in the neighborhood of such that x∗ = x′ except that |x∗2 − x′2| < ε.
The second element of x is kb. Assume x∗2 > x
′
2 without loss of generality. Let
(x∗, y∗, a, A, µ, m) be a saddle point of Ln(x∗, y∗, a, A, µ, m), (x′, y′, a, A, µ, m)
be a saddle point of Ln(x′, y, a, A, µ, m). In the following argument, the aggregate
states and the idiosyncratic shock are omitted. By the definition of saddle point,
∀y ∈ Γ(x∗), µ ∈ R4+, Ln(x∗, y, m∗) ≤ Ln(x∗, y∗,m∗) ≤ Ln(x∗, y∗,m)
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∀y ∈ Γ(x′), µ ∈ R4+, Ln(x′, y, m′) ≤ Ln(x′, y′,m′) ≤ Ln(x′, y′,m)
Then,
Ln(x∗, y′,m∗) ≤ Ln(x∗, y∗,m∗) ≤ Ln(x∗, y∗,m′)
Ln(x′, y∗,m′) ≤ Ln(x′, y′,m′) ≤ Ln(x′, y′,m∗)
Then,
Ln(x∗, y′,m∗)− Ln(x′, y′,m∗) ≤ Ln(x∗, y∗,m∗)− Ln(x′, y′,m′)
≤ Ln(x∗, y∗,m′)− Ln(x′, y∗,m′)
As kb are not in the constraint in ≥ 0 or iu ≥ 0 (ib = kb(1− δ)),
(1− δ)pup ≤ L
n(x∗, y∗,m∗)− Ln(x′, y′,m′)
x∗ − x′ ≤ (1− δ)pup
Therefore Ln2 (x
∗, y∗,m∗) = lim
|x∗−x′|→0
Ln(x∗,y∗,m∗)−Ln(x′,y′,m′)
x∗−x′ = (1 − δ)pu. {Ln2}
converges uniformly to (1− δ)pup. Here Ln(x∗, y∗,m∗) = vn+1(x∗). Thus vn2 (x; )
converges uniformly to (1 − δ)pup. According to Theorem 9.13 in Apostol(1974),
v is partially differentiable with respect to kb. v2(x; ) = (1− δ)pup.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4. The Kuhn-Tucker condition for the problem with re-
spect to kb is:
λ− puq0













q0 − λ −m2
rq0
q0 − λ = 0
∂v2 stands for the subdifferential at that point. Since v is partially differentiable
with respect to kb, ∂v2 = pup(1−δ). If λ−puq0q0−λ +β(1−η+ηpc)(1−δ)E(p′up′) > 0,
m2 > 0. iu = 0. Aggregate demand for used capital is zero. If λ−puq0q0−λ + β(1− η +
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ηpc)(1 − δ)E(p′up′) < 0, m1 > 0. in = 0. Aggregate demand for new capital is
zero.
Proof of Lemma 4 . The proof uses the corollary 1 of contraction mapping theorem
in SL. Let S be the set of continuous functions f(x, y) = u(x) + ppu(1 − δ)kb. S
is a closed set of C(X). Need to prove TS ⊆ S. The plant has three choices
on investment after selling all their capital: to sell good capital, to buy capital and
inaction. The operator can be rewrite as Tv(x) = maxkg{vs, vn, vb}+pup(1−δ)kb.
Define u(x) = max{vs, vn, vb}. Want to show u(x) is continuous and does not
depend on kb. As Tv is continuous, u(x) is also continuous. The value function
when selling good capital is:
vs(kg, a; ) = maxk′gf(kg, a, A)p + pu(kg(1− δ)− rk′g)p + βη
∫
u(k′g, a; )Q(z, dz
′)
+ β(1− η)(1− δ)pcE(p′up′)k′g
The value function of inaction is:










After applying the no-arbitrage condition, the value function for buying capital is:
vb(kg, a; ) = maxk′gf(kg, a, A)p + p1(rk
′




′; )Q(z, dz′) + β(1− η)(1− δ)pck′gE(p′up′)
where p1 = 1rq0 (β(1− δ)(η + (1− η)pc)E(p′up′)(1− q0)− rp). p1 < 0 because of
pu ≤ 1 and no-arbitrage condition. Thus vn, vs and vb do not depend on kb. Then
Tv ⊆ S, therefore v = Tv ⊆ S.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.6. First, I show that the unique fixed point of the problem
3.15 exists. The argument is similar to the proof for proposition 3.4.1. The return
function in (3.14) is continuous. Let (kng , k
n
g a
n, An, µn) → (kg, k′g, a, A, µ). When
rk′g = kg(1 − δ), F = f(kg, a, A)p + β(1 − δ)(1 − η)pck′gE(p′up′). No matter
rkng > k
n
g (1−δ) or rkng < kng (1−δ), the limit is the same. Thus F is continuous. Γ is
fixed. After applying the similar argument for the continuity under integration, the
unique fixed point can be obtained after using Blackwell conditions and Contraction
Mapping Theorem.
Next, I show that v is strictly concave in kg. F is strictly concave in kg. That
is, for any kg ∈ Eg,k̃g ∈ Eg, for any θ ∈ (0, 1), kθg = θkg + (1 − θ)k̃g. Need to
show F (kθg , k
′θ
g , a) ≥ θF (kg, k′g, a; ) + (1 − θ)F (k̃g, k̃′g, a; ), the inequality is strict
when kg 6= k′g. We have eight cases:









































Since kg and k̃g are symmetric, some cases are omitted. Before I prove the strict








−p1 − pu = 1rq0 (1 − λ)(rp − C̄). Rearrange the no-arbitrage condition, rp =
q0−λ
puq0−λC̄. Since pu ≤ 1 and λ < 1, −p1 − pu > 0.
Case 1, 2, and 6 are obviously because of the strict concavity of f(kg, a, A).
In case 3, F (kg, k′g, a; ) = f(kg, a, A)p + p1(rk
′






′), F (k̃g, k̃′g, a; ) = f(k̃g, a, A)p + pu(k̃g(1− δ)− rk̃′g(1− δ)) + β(1−
δ)(1 − η)pck′gE(p′up′). F (kθg , k′θg , a; ) ≥ θF (kg, k′g, a; ) + (1 − θ)f(k̃g, a, A)p −
p1(k̃g(1 − δ) − k̃′g) + β(1 − δ)(1 − η)pck′gE(p′up′)) > θF (kg, k′g, a; ) + (1 −




g , a; ) ≥ θ(f(kg, a, A) − pu(rk′g − kg(1 − δ)) +
β(1 − δ)(1 − η)pck′gE(p′up′)) + (1 − θ)F (k̃g, k̃′g, a; ) > θF (kg, k′g, a; ) + (1 −




g(1 − δ), then θ(rk′g − kg(1 − δ)) = (1 −
θ)(k̃g(1− δ)− rk̃′g). F (kθg , k′θg , a; ) = f(kθg , a, A) + β(1− δ)(1− η)pck′gE(p′up′) ≥
θF (kg, k
′
g, a; )+(1−θ)F (k̃g, k̃′g, a; )+(−p1−pu)θ(rk′g−kg(1−δ)) > θF (kg, k′g, a; )+
(1− θ)F (k̃g, k̃′g, a; ). In case 7, F (kg, k′g, a; ) is the same as before, F (k̃g, k̃′g, a; ) =
f(k̃g, a, A)p+β(1− δ)(1− η)pck′gE(p′up′). rk′θg −kθg(1− δ) = θ(rk′g−kg(1− δ)).
F (kθg , k
′θ
g , a; ) = (f(k
θ
g , a, A)−θf(kg, a, A)−(1−θ)f(k̃g, a, A)p+θF (kg, k′g, a; )+
(1 − θ)F (k̃g, k̃′g, a). In case 8, F (kg, k′g, a; ) = f(kg, a, A) + pu(rk′g − kg(1 −






′). k′θg −kθg(1−δ) = θ(kg(1−δ)k′g)). Thus F (kθg , k′θg , a) = (f(kθg , a, A)−
θf(kg, a, A)− (1− θ)f(k̃g, a, A))p + θF (kg, k′g, a; ) + (1− θ)F (k̃g, k̃′g, a).
It is easy to check that integration preserves monotonicity and concavity un-
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der my assumptions. Now I need to prove that v is strictly concave in kg by applying
the Corollary 1 to the Contraction Mapping Theorem in SL. Let C ′(X4) ⊂ C(X4)
be the set of bounded, continuous, weakly concave functions on X4. Let C ′′(X4)
bet the set of strictly concave functions. It is sufficient to show that T [C ′(X4)] ⊂
C ′′(X4) since C ′(X4) is a closed subset of C(X4). Γ is convex-valued. Thus
k0 6= k1 θ ∈ (0, 1) and kθ = θk0 + (1− θ)k1.
Let y0 ∈ Γ and y1 ∈ Γ, then yθ = θy0 + (1− θ)y1, yθ ∈ Γ.
Tu(kθ, a, A, µ) ≥ F (kθ, yθ, a, A, µ)p + β
∫
u(yθ, a
′, A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)
> θ[F (k0, y0)p + β
∫
u(y0, a
′, A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)]
+ (1− θ)[F (k1, y1)p + β
∫
u(y1, a
′, A′, µ′)Q(z, dz′)]
= θTu(k0, a, A, µ) + (1− θ)Tu(k1, a, A, µ)
By applying Theorem 3(P. 117) in Berge(1963). The policy correspondence is a
continuous and single valued function.
For strict increasing value function, I need to prove for every (y, a; A, µ),
F (·, y, a; A, µ) is strictly increasing. Pick x1, x2 ∈ X . Let x1 < x2. Want
to prove F (x1, k′g, a; ) < F (x2, k
′
g, a; ) for every k
′
g ∈ X . If rk′g > x2(1 −
δ) or rk′g < x1(1 − δ). it is obvious. When rk′g ∈ (x1(1 − δ), x2(1 − δ)),
F (x1, k
′
g, a; ) = f(x1, a, A)p + p1(rk
′
g − x1(1− δ)) + β(1− δ)(1− η)pck′gE(p′up′),
F (x2, k
′
g, a; ) = f(x2, a, A)p+ pu(x2(1− δ)− rk′g)+β(1− δ)(1− η)pck′gE(p′up′).
Since p1 < 0. Done. When k′g = x2(1− δ), F (x2, k′g, a; ) = f(x2, a, A)p + β(1−
δ)(1− η)pck′gE(p′up′),F (x1, k′g, a; ) = f(x1, a, A)p + p1(k′g − x1(1− δ)) + β(1−
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δ)(1 − η)pck′gE(p′up′). Thus F (x2, k′g, a) > F (x1, k′g, a). When k′g = x1(1 − δ),
F (x2, k
′
g, a) = f(x2, a, A)p + pu(x2(1− δ)− k′g) + β(1− δ)(1− η)pck′gE(p′up′) >
aAx̃1 + β(1− δ)(1− η)pck′gE(p′up′) = F (x1, k′g, a). The argument is the same for
strict concavity. Thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.7. Pick x = (a,A, µ1) ∈ Z × D1. The target levels and
the cutoff values are defined as in main text. Let u∗b and u
∗
s be the maximums of






kg(1− δ), x′)Q(z, dz′) + β(1− η)(1− δ)2pck′gE(p′up′) (C.3)
Equation C.3 describes the value when the plant does not adjust his capital except
selling bad capital. Given x = (kg, a, A, µ1) ∈ Eg × Z ×D, denote ub the value of
purchasing capital, ub = p1(rk∗1 − kg(1 − δ)) + u∗b . Denote us the value of selling
good capital, us = pu(kg(1 − δ) − rk∗2) + u∗s. x1(x) is the cutoff values such that








Now I show that k∗1 ≤ k2∗. I first show that u is proper. As u is monotonic,
it is differentiable almost everywhere. Applying Corollary 25.1.1 in Rockafel-
lar(1970), a concave function, which is differentiable at a given point, is proper.
As u is continuous, it is closed. As u is bounded, the right and left derivative u′+(x)
and u′−(x) are both bounded in the interior of Eg. By theorem 24.1, the left and
right derivatives are non-increasing functions. u′+(x) ≤ u′−(x). Thus the multival-
ued mapping ∂u(x) = {x∗ ∈ int(Eg)|u′+(x) ≤ x∗ ≤ u′−(x)}. By Theorem 28.3,
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′)− β(1− η)(1− δ)pcE(p′up′) = 0 (C.5)
Suppose k∗1 > k
∗




−(x) are both non-increasing functions, u
′
+(k1∗) ≤
u′−(k1∗) ≤ u′+(k∗2) ≤ u′−(k∗2). Thus ∂u(k∗1) ≤ ∂u(k∗2). After integration,
∫
∂u(k∗1)Q(z, dz
′) ≤ ∫ ∂u(k∗2)Q(z, dz′). But −p1 > pu. Contradiction. Suppose
k∗1 = k
∗
2 , the plant can lose by buying and selling without changing the k
′
g. Thus
u(k′g) is not well-defined function. Contradiction.
So x1 ≤ x2. When kg < x1, the plant only buys capital or does not adjust.
When kg > x2, the plant only sell capital or does not adjust. When plants buy or
sell, the target levels do not depend on their predetermined capital stock. Since the
policy function hg is continuous on kg as shown in Proposition 3.4.6, for kg < x1,
the plant all invests or does not adjust. Otherwise, the policy function has jumps.
Similar, when kg > x2, the plant all sells or does not adjust.
When kg < x1, plants decide to invest if the marginal benefit to invest
rp1 + βη
∫
∂u(kg) + β(1− η)(1− δ)pcE(p′up′) is positive. According to (C.4) and
u′+ is an non-increasing function, rp1+βη
∫
∂u′+(kg)+β(1−η)(1−δ)pcE(p′up′) ≥
0. That is , plants are indifferent or prefer to invest. If all plants with kg < x1
are indifferent, the value of investing equals to the value of inaction. Thus p1 =
βη(Eu(k∗1)−Eu( 1r kg(1−δ)))+β(1−η)(1−δ)pc(k∗1− 1r kg(1−δ))E(p′p′u)
rk∗1−kg(1−δ) for all kg < x1. Since u is
strictly concave, this can’t be true. Thus there must have some point with strict
inequality. Thus at least the plant prefers to invest at one level of capital stock.
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Therefore plants invest when kg < x1, as the policy function is continuous. The
argument for selling decisions when kg > x2 is same. If kg ∈ (x1, x2), the plant
can’t buy or sell, thus not adjust.
C.3 A Characterization of the Frictionless Model
The individual plant’s problem:
v(k, a; A, µn) = maxk′,naAf(k, n)− wn + rk′ − k(1− δ)
+ d(A, µn)η
∫
v(k′, a′; A′, µ′n)Q(z, dz
′) + d(A, µn)(1− η)pcuk′
(C.6)
where k ∈ [0, k̄n]. pcu is the discount of selling price for exiting firms. The repre-
sentative household’s problem is the same as the baseline model. The law of mo-
tions for distribution µn over (k, a) is µ′n = Hn(A, µn). The good market clearing
condition is:








Definition 5. The recursive competitive equilibrium for the economy
(β, f, Q, η, U, δ, pcu, α, ν)
is a set of functions (p, w, Hv, u, hn, n, N s, C,N) such that: 1) (u, hn, n) solve
plants’ problem given (p, w); 2) (C, N s) solve household’s problem C.6 given
(w, p); 3) Good market clearing condition (C.7) satisfies; 4) Labor market clears;
5)Hn is generated from the equilibrium price, decision rules and exogenous aggre-
gate shock.
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The law of motions Hn can be derived similarly from equation (3.16) by
substituting hn for hg and changing the feasibility set for k.
C.4 A Characterization of the Fixed Irreversibility Model
The individual firm’s problem:
v(k, a; A, µf ) = maxk′,naAf(k, n)− wn + 1rk′>k(1−δ)(rk′ − k(1− δ))
+ 1rk′≤k(1−δ)pu(k(1− δ)− rk′) + d(A, µf )η
∫
v(k′, a′; A′, µ′f )Q(z, dz
′)
+ d(A, µf )(1− η)pck′E(p′up′)
(C.8)
where k ∈ [0, k̄f ]. pu is the degree of fixed irreversibility. The representative
household’s problem is the same as the baseline model. The law of motions for
distribution µf over (k, a) is µ′f = Hf (A, µf ). The good market clearing condition
is:
C(A, µf ) = η
∫










Definition 6. The recursive competitive equilibrium for the economy
(β, f, Q, η, U, δ, pfu, pc, α, ν)
is a set of functions (p, w, Hf , u, hf , n, N s, C,N) such that: 1) (u, hf , n) solve
plants’ problem C.8 given (p, w); 2) (C, N s) solve household’s problem given
(w, p); 3) Good market clearing condition (C.9) satisfies; 4) Labor market clears;
5)Hf is generated from the equilibrium price, decision rules and exogenous aggre-
gate shock.
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The law of motions Hf can be derived similarly from equation (3.16) by
substituting hf for hg and changing the feasibility set for k. In equilibrium, the
firm’s optimal investment decision also follows a two-sided (s, S) rules. The proof
is similar to that in the baseline model.
C.5 Numerical Details
The individual plant’s problem has (kg, a; Kg, A). a is a discrete variable.
The rest are continuous variables. The state space is discretized as follows:
1. nk = 60 is the number of the grid points for kg between [1.0−5, 4], with log-
equal-spaced grid width.
2. nidio = 6 is the number of the grid points for idiosyncratic shocks with log-
equal-spaced width. The total grid width is two times standard deviation. I
compute the transition matrix using Tauchen (1986)’s method.
3. na = 7 is the number of the grid points for aggregate good capital stock
between [0.57, 1.178], equal-spaced.
4. nagg = 11 is the number of the grid points for aggregate technology shock in
[0.92, 1.08], with more grids in the middle. I use seven integration nodes for
the Gauss-Hermite Quadrature.
The plant’s dynamic programming problem is computed with value function itera-
tion and Howard Improvement. That is, after one period value function iteration, I
use twenty periods policy improvement. The Newton method is employed to find
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the optimum in each grid points. I also compare the results with Golden section
search. They are very similar. Since kg, Kg and A are continuous, the in-between
values are interpolated with a three-dimensional cubic spline, with a “not-a-knot”
condition as stated in Kahn and Thomas(2003).
The simulation approach follows the method in Bachman, Caballero and
Engel(2008). Beginning with an exogenous capital distribution and stationary dis-
tribution for idiosyncratic shock, the real distribution is computed every period ac-
cording to the evolutions of idiosyncratic shock and aggregate shock. When the
mass for some capital stock is less than 1.0−10, it is taken out of the economy and I
rescale the total mass accordingly.
In each simulation period, the equilibrium p and pu are characterized as the
root for two equations with two unknowns, the new good market clearing condition
and consistent belief condition. These two equations are derived after the decision
rules, previous distribution, x and λ. I use bisection method to find the root: In
the upper loop, I need to find two boundary prices pl and ph which bracket the
equilibrium p. Pick one pl, in the lower loop, I need to find the equilibrium pu
which satisfies the consistent belief condition with pl. After employing the bisection
method for p∗u,l, The aggregate variables under pl are revealed. Compare the two
prices to see whether the interval includes a zero-root. If does, apply the bisection
method to find the root, otherwise change the boundary. The degree of precision
for finding the root is 5.0−6. The economy is simulated for 500 periods where the
first 100 periods are dropped. The stopping criteria for the metric between two
successive approximate laws of motions in 1.0−5.
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